

Robust Probability Updating [☆]

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Abstract

This paper discusses an alternative to conditioning that may be used when the probability distribution is not fully specified. It does not require any assumptions (such as CAR: coarsening at random) on the unknown distribution. The well-known Monty Hall problem is the simplest scenario where neither naive conditioning nor the CAR assumption suffice to determine an updated probability distribution. This paper thus addresses a generalization of that problem to arbitrary distributions on finite outcome spaces, arbitrary sets of ‘messages’, and (almost) arbitrary loss functions, and provides existence and characterization theorems for robust probability updating strategies. We find that for logarithmic loss, optimality is characterized by an elegant condition, which we call *RCAR* (*reverse coarsening at random*). Under certain conditions, the same condition also characterizes optimality for a much larger class of loss functions, and we obtain an objective and general answer to how one should update probabilities in the light of new information.

Keywords: probability updating, maximum entropy, loss functions, minimax decision making

1. Introduction

There are many situations in which a decision maker receives incomplete data and still has to reach conclusions about these data. One type of incomplete data is *coarse* data: instead of the real outcome of a random event, the decision maker observes a subset of the possible outcomes, and knows only that the actual outcome is an element of this subset. An example frequently occurs in questionnaires, where people may be asked if their date of birth lies between 1950 and 1960 or between 1960 and 1970 et cetera. Their exact year of birth is unknown to us, but at least we now know for sure in which decade they are born. We introduce a simple and concrete motivating instance of coarse data with the following example.

[☆]This work is adapted from dissertation [1, Chapters 6 and 7], which extends MSc. thesis [2].

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Example A (Fair die). Suppose I throw a fair die. I get to see the result of the throw, but you do not. Now I tell you that the result lies in the set $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$. This is an example of coarse data. You know that I used a fair die and that what I tell you is true. Now you are asked to give the probability that I rolled a 3. Likely, you would say that the probability of each of the remaining possible results is $1/4$. This is the knee-jerk reaction of someone who studied probability theory, since this is standard *conditioning*. But is this always correct?

Suppose that there is only one alternative set of results I could give you after rolling the die, namely the set $\{3, 4, 5, 6\}$. I can now follow a *coarsening mechanism*: a procedure that tells me which subset to reveal given a particular result of the die roll. If the outcome is 1, 2, 5, or 6, there is nothing for me to choose. Suppose that if the outcome is 3 or 4, the coarsening mechanism I use selects set $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ or set $\{3, 4, 5, 6\}$ at random, each with probability $1/2$. If I throw the die 6000 times, I expect to see the outcome 3 a thousand times. Therefore I expect to report the set $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ five hundred times after I see the outcome 3. It is clear that I expect to report the set $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ 3000 times in total. So for die rolls where I told you $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$, the probability of the true outcome being 3 is actually $1/6$ with this coarsening mechanism. We see that the prediction of $1/4$ from the first paragraph was not correct, in the sense that the probabilities computed there do not correspond to the long-run relative frequencies. We conclude that the knee-jerk reaction is not always correct.

In Example A we have seen that standard conditioning does not always give the correct answers. Heitjan and Rubin [3] answer the question under what circumstances standard conditioning of coarse data is correct. They discovered a necessary and sufficient condition of the coarsening mechanism, called *coarsening at random (CAR)*. A coarsening mechanism satisfies the CAR condition if, for each subset y of the outcomes, the probability of choosing to report y is the same no matter which outcome $x \in y$ is the true outcome. It depends on the arrangement of possible revealed subsets whether a coarsening mechanism exists that satisfies CAR. It holds automatically if the subsets that can be revealed partition the sample space. As noted by Grünwald and Halpern [4] however, as soon as events overlap, there exist distributions on the space for which CAR does not hold. In many such situations it even cannot hold; see Gill and Grünwald [5] for a complete characterization of the — quite restricted — set of situations in which CAR can hold. No coarsening mechanism satisfies the CAR condition for Example A.

We hasten to add that we neither question the validity of conditioning nor do we want to replace it by something else. The real problem lies not with conditioning, but with conditioning within the wrong sample space, in which the coarsening mechanism cannot be represented. If we had a distribution P on the correct, larger space, which allows for statements like ‘the probability is α that I choose $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ to reveal if the outcome is 3’, then conditioning would give the correct results. The problem with coarse data is though that we often do not have enough information to identify P — e.g. we do not know the value of α and do not want to assume that it is $1/2$. Henceforth, we shall refer to conditioning in the overly simple space as ‘naive conditioning’. In this paper we propose update rules for situations in which naive conditioning gives the wrong answer, and conditioning in the right space is problematic because the un-

derlying distribution is partially unknown. These are invariably situations in which two or more of the potentially observed events overlap.

We illustrate this further with a famously counter-intuitive example: the Monty Hall puzzle, posed by Selvin [6] and popularized years later in Ask Marilyn, a weekly column in Parade Magazine by Marilyn vos Savant [7].

Example B (Monty Hall). Suppose you are on a game show and you may choose one of three doors. Behind one of the doors a car can be found, but the other two only hide a goat. Initially the car is equally likely to be behind each of the doors. After you have picked one of the doors, the host Monty Hall, who knows the location of the prize, will open one of the other doors, revealing a goat. Now you are asked if you would like to switch from the door you chose to the other unopened door. Is it a good idea to switch?

At this moment we will not answer this question, but we show that the problem of choosing whether to switch doors is an example of the coarse data problem. The unknown random value we are interested in is the location of the car: one of the three doors. When the host opens a door different from the one you picked, revealing a goat, this is equivalent to reporting a subset. The subset he reports is the set of the two doors that are still closed. For example, if he opens door 2, this tells us that the true value, the location of the car, is in the subset $\{1, 3\}$. Note that if you have by chance picked the correct door, there are two possible doors Monty Hall can open, so also two subsets he can report. This implies that Monty has a choice in reporting a subset. How does Monty’s coarsening mechanism influence your prediction of the true location of the car?

The CAR condition can only be satisfied for very particular distributions of where the prize is: the probability that the prize is hidden behind the initially chosen door must be either 0 or 1, otherwise no CAR coarsening mechanism exists [4, Example 3.3]¹. If the prize is hidden in any other way, for example uniformly at random as we assume, then CAR cannot hold, and naive conditioning will result in an incorrect conclusion for at least one of the two subsets.

Examples A and B are just two instances of a more general problem: the number of outcomes may be arbitrary; the initial distribution of the true outcome may be any distribution; and the subsets of outcomes that may be reported to the decision maker may be any family of sets. Our goal is to define general procedures that tell us how to update the probabilities of the outcomes after making a coarse observation, in such situations where naive conditioning is not adequate. We are aiming for modular methods that do not enforce a particular interpretation of probability. In Example A, we saw “objective” probabilities: the original distributions were known, and the updated probabilities we found could again be interpreted as frequencies over many repetitions of the same experiment. The original distribution of the outcomes could however also express a subjective prior belief of how likely each outcome is. For example, in Example B, the uniform distribution of the location of the car requires an assumption on the frequent-

¹This uses the *weak* version of CAR in the terminology of Jaeger [8], in which outcomes with probability 0 are exempt from the equality constraint. A *strong* CAR coarsening mechanism does not exist regardless of the probabilities with which the prize is hidden.

ist’s part, while it may be a reasonable choice of prior for a subjective Bayesian [9]. In this case, the updated probabilities after a coarse observation take the role of the Bayesian posterior distribution. In any case, we will refer to the initial probability of an outcome, regardless of observations, as the *marginal* probability.

Without any assumptions on the quizmaster’s strategy (i.e. the coarsening mechanism), the conditional distributions of outcomes given observations will be unknown, and this uncertainty cannot be fully expressed by a single probability distribution over the outcomes. One way to deal with this is by means of imprecise probability, i.e. by explicitly tracking all possible quizmaster strategies and their effects [10]. We however focus on obtaining a single (precise) updated probability. To get such a single answer, we could make some assumption about how the quizmaster chooses his strategy. Assuming that the coarsening mechanism satisfies CAR is one such approach, but as we saw in the two examples, there are scenarios where this assumption cannot hold. We instead take a *worst-case approach*, treating the coarsening of the observation and the subsequent probability update as a game between two players: the *quizmaster* and the *contestant* (named for their roles in the Monty Hall scenario). The subset of outcomes communicated by the quizmaster to the contestant will be called the *message*.

In this fictional game, the quizmaster’s goal is the opposite of the contestant’s, namely to make predicting the true outcome as hard as possible for the contestant. This type of zero-sum game, in which some information is revealed to the contestant was also considered by Grünwald and Halpern [11] and Ozdenoren and Peck [12]. Such situations are rare in practice: The sender of a message might be motivated by interests other than informing us (for example, a newspaper may be trying to optimize its sales figures, or a company may want to present its performance in the best light), but rarely by trying to be as uninformative as possible (though see Section 5.5, where we consider the case that the players’ goals are not diametrically opposed). In other situations, the ‘sender’ might not be a rational being at all, but just some unknown process. Yet this game is a useful way to look at the problem of updating our probabilities even if we do not believe that the coarsening mechanism is chosen adversarially: if we simply do not know how ‘nature’ chooses which message to give us and do not want to make any assumptions about this, then choosing the worst-case (or *minimax*) optimal probability update as defined here guarantees that we incur at most some fixed expected loss, while any other probability update may lead to a larger expected loss depending on the unknown coarsening mechanism. While from a Bayesian point of view, such a choice might at first seem overly pessimistic, we note that in all cases we consider, our approach is fully consistent with a Bayesian one — our results can be interpreted as recommending a certain prior on the quizmaster’s assignment of messages to outcomes, which in simple cases (such as Monty Hall) coincides with a prior that Bayesians would be tempted to adopt as well.

We will employ a loss function to measure how well the quizmaster and the contestant are doing at this game. Our results apply to a wide variety of loss functions. For an analysis of the Monty Hall game, 0-1 loss would be appropriate, as the contestant must choose a single door; this is the approach used by Gill [9] and Gnedin [13]. Other loss functions, such as logarithmic loss and Brier loss (see e.g. Grünwald and Dawid [14]), also allow the contestant to formulate their prediction of where the prize is hidden as an arbitrary probability distribution over the outcomes.

We model probability updating as a game as follows. An outcome x is drawn with known marginal probability p_x and shown to the quizmaster, who picks a consistent message $y \ni x$ using his coarsening mechanism $P(y \mid x)$. Seeing only y , the contestant makes a prediction in the form of a probability mass function $Q(\cdot \mid y)$ on outcomes. Then x is revealed and the prediction quality measured using the loss function L . The quizmaster/contestant aim to maximize/minimize the expected loss

$$\sum_x p_x \sum_{y \ni x} P(y \mid x) L(x, Q(\cdot \mid y)). \quad (1)$$

For the Monty Hall game with logarithmic or Brier, i.e. squared loss, the worst-case optimal answer for the contestant is to put probability $1/3$ on his initially chosen door and $2/3$ on the other door. (These probabilities agree with the literature on the Monty Hall game.) Surprisingly, we will see (in Example D on page 17) that for very similar games, logarithmic and Brier loss may lead to two different answers!

We will find that for finite outcome spaces, both players in our game have worst-case optimal strategies for many loss functions: the quizmaster has a strategy that makes the contestant's prediction task as hard as possible, and the contestant has a strategy that is guaranteed to give good predictions no matter how the quizmaster coarsens. We give characterizations that allow us to recognize such strategies, for different conditions on the loss functions.

Example A (continued). For logarithmic loss, the worst-case optimal prediction of the die roll conditional on the revealed subset is found with the help of Theorem 10. The worst-case optimal prediction given that you observe the set $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ is: predict outcomes 1 and 2 each with probability $1/3$, and predict 3 and 4 each with probability $1/6$. Symmetrically, given that you observe the set $\{3, 4, 5, 6\}$, the worst-case optimal prediction is: 3 and 4 with probability $1/6$, and 5 and 6 with probability $1/3$.

These probabilities correspond with the uniform coarsening mechanism given earlier. However, it is a good prediction even if you do not know what coarsening mechanism I am using. An intuitive argument for this is the following: If I wanted, I could use a very extreme coarsening mechanism, always choosing to reveal the set $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ when the die comes up 3 or 4. But this is balanced by the possibility that I might be using the opposite coarsening mechanism, which always reveals $\{3, 4, 5, 6\}$ if the result is 3 or 4. The worst-case optimal prediction given above hedges against both possibilities.

1.1. Overview of contents

In Section 2, we will give a precise definition of the ‘conditioning game’ we described. In Section 3, we find general conditions on the loss function under which worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster and contestant exist, and we characterize such strategies. (See Figure 3 for a visual illustration of the concepts used in this section.) If stronger conditions hold, worst-case optimal strategies for both players may be easier to recognize. This is explored for two classes of loss functions in Section 4; in particular, we find that for local proper loss functions (among which logarithmic loss), worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster are characterized by a simple condition on their probabilities that we call the *RCAR* (*reverse CAR*) condition. RCAR bears a striking similarity to CAR, but with the roles of outcomes and messages




Figure 1: Classes of games for which the RCAR condition characterizes optimality. \mathcal{Y} is the set of messages and L is the loss function.

interchanged. Also, by Lemma 14, if a betting game is played repeatedly and the contestant is allowed to distribute investments over different outcomes and to reinvest all capital gained so far in each round, then the same strategy is optimal, *regardless of the pay-offs!* An overview of the theorems and the conditions under which they apply is given in Table 1 on page 13.

Then in Section 5 we look at the influence of the set of available messages, imposing only the minimal symmetry requirement on the loss function. We prove that for graph and matroid games (and only these) the optimality condition is again RCAR. As RCAR is independent of the loss function, for such games probability updating can hence be meaningfully defined and performed completely agnostic of the task at hand. Many examples are included to illustrate (the limits of) the theoretical results. Section 6 gives some concluding remarks. An overview of the results in this work is presented in Figure 1. All proofs are given in Appendix A.

Highlight. A central feature of probability distributions is that they summarize what a decision maker would do under a variety of circumstances (loss functions): for each particular loss function the decision maker minimizes expected loss (maximizes utility) using the same distribution no matter what specific loss function is used. Since we generalize conditioning by using a minimax approach, one might expect that for different loss functions one ends up with different updated probabilities. Still, we show that for a rich selection of scenarios optimality is characterized by the RCAR condition, which is independent of the loss function. As a result, our updated probabilities are *application-independent*, and we may hence think of them — if we are willing to take a cautious (minimax) approach — as expressing what an experimenter *should* believe after having received the data.

We isolate two distinct classes of scenarios where such application independence obtains. First, games with graph and matroid message sets (extending Monty Hall) and symmetric loss functions. Second, graphs with arbitrary message sets and proper local loss functions, including the symmetric logarithmic loss as well as its asymmetric generalizations appropriate for Kelly gambling with arbitrary payoffs. In these scenarios

our application-independent update rule has an objective appeal, and we feel that its importance may transcend that of being “merely” minimax optimal.

This work is an extension of Feenstra [2] to loss functions other than logarithmic loss, and to the case where the worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster assigns probability 0 to some combinations of outcomes x and messages y with $x \in y$. It can also be seen as a concrete application of the ideas in Grünwald and Dawid [14] about minimax optimal decision making and its relation to entropy. A more extensive discussion of worst-case optimal probability updating can be found in Van Ommen [1]; in particular, there the question of efficient algorithms for determining worst-case optimal strategies is also considered.

2. Definitions and problem formulation

A (*probability updating*) *game* \mathcal{G} is defined as a quadruple $(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, p, L)$, where \mathcal{X} is a finite set, \mathcal{Y} is a family of distinct subsets of \mathcal{X} with $\bigcup_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} y = \mathcal{X}$, p is a strictly positive probability mass function on \mathcal{X} , and L is a function $L : \mathcal{X} \times \Delta_{\mathcal{X}} \rightarrow [0, \infty]$, where $\Delta_{\mathcal{X}}$ is the set of all probability mass functions on \mathcal{X} . We call \mathcal{X} the *outcome space*, \mathcal{Y} the *message structure*, p the *marginal distribution*, and L the *loss function*. It is clear that outcomes with zero marginal probability p do not contribute to the objective (1), so we may exclude them without loss of generality. Let us illustrate these definitions by applying them to our example.

Example B (continued). We assume the car is hidden uniformly at random behind one of the three doors. With this assumption, we can abstract away the initial choice of a door by the contestant: by symmetry, we can assume without loss of generality that he always picks door 2. Then the probability updating game starts with the quizmaster opening door 1 or 3, thereby giving the message “the car is behind door 2 or 3” or “the car is behind door 1 or 2”, respectively. This can be expressed as follows in our formalization:

- outcome space $\mathcal{X} = \{x_1, x_2, x_3\}$;
- message space $\mathcal{Y} = \{y_1, y_2\}$ with $y_1 = \{x_1, x_2\}$ and $y_2 = \{x_2, x_3\}$;
- marginal distribution p uniform on \mathcal{X} .

If a loss function L is also given, this fully specifies a game. One example is randomized 0-1 loss, which is given by $L(x, Q) = 1 - Q(x)$. Here x is the true outcome, and Q is the contestant’s prediction of the true outcome in the form of a probability distribution. Thus the prediction Q is awarded a smaller loss if it assigned a larger probability $Q(x)$ to the outcome x that actually obtained. We will see other examples of loss functions in Section 2.2.

A function from some finite set S to the reals $\mathbf{R} = (-\infty, \infty)$ corresponds to an $|S|$ -dimensional vector when we fix an order on the elements of S . We write \mathbf{R}^S for the set of such functions/vectors. Even if no order on S is specified, this allows us to apply concepts from linear algebra to \mathbf{R}^S without ambiguity. For example, we may say that

some set is an affine subspace of \mathbf{R}^S . (This identification and the resulting notation are also used by Schrijver [15].)

Using this correspondence, we identify the elements of Δ_X with the $|\mathcal{X}|$ -dimensional vectors in the unit simplex, though we use ordinary function notation $P(x)$ for its elements. The probability mass function p that is part of a game's definition is also a vector in Δ_X . Vector notation p_x will be used to refer to its elements to set p apart from P , which will denote distributions chosen by the quizmaster rather than fixed by the game.

For any message $y \subseteq \mathcal{X}$, we define $\Delta_y = \{P \in \Delta_X \mid P(x) = 0 \text{ for } x \notin y\}$. Note that these are vectors of the same length as those in Δ_X , though contained within a lower-dimensional affine subspace.

A loss function L is called *proper* if $P \in \arg \min_{Q \in \Delta_X} \mathbf{E}_{X \sim P} L(X, Q)$ for all $P \in \Delta_X$, and *strictly proper* if this minimizer is unique (this is standard terminology; see for instance Gneiting and Raftery [16]). Thus if a predicting agent believes the true distribution of an outcome to be given by some P , such a loss function will encourage him to report $Q = P$ as his prediction.

2.1. Strategies

Strategies for the players are specified by conditional distributions: a strategy P for the quizmaster consists of distributions on \mathcal{Y} , one for each possible $x \in \mathcal{X}$, and a strategy Q for the contestant consists of distributions on \mathcal{X} , one for each possible $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. These strategies define how the two players act in any situation: the quizmaster's strategy defines how he chooses a message containing the true outcome (the coarsening mechanism), and the contestant's strategy defines his prediction for each message he might receive.

We write $P(\cdot \mid x)$ for the distribution on \mathcal{Y} the quizmaster plays when the true outcome is $x \in \mathcal{X}$. Because $p_x > 0$, this conditional distribution can be recovered from the joint $P(x, y) := P(y \mid x)p_x$; we will use this joint distribution to specify a strategy for the quizmaster. If $P(y) := \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} P(x, y) > 0$, we may also write $P(\cdot \mid y)$ for the vector in Δ_y given by $P(x \mid y) := P(x, y)/P(y)$. No such rewrites can be made for Q , as no marginal $Q(y)$ is specified by the game or by the strategy Q . To shorten notation and to emphasize that Q is not a joint distribution, we write Q_y rather than $Q(\cdot \mid y)$ for the distribution that the contestant plays in response to message y .

We restrict the quizmaster to conditional distributions P for which $P(y \mid x) = 0$ if $x \notin y$; that is, he may not 'lie' to the contestant. We make no similar requirement on the contestant's choice of Q , though for proper loss functions, and in fact all other loss functions we will consider in our examples, the contestant can gain nothing from using a strategy Q for which $Q_y(x) > 0$ where $x \notin y$.

Example B (continued). The table to the right specifies all aspects of a game except for its loss function: its outcome space (here, for the Monty Hall game, $\mathcal{X} = \{x_1, x_2, x_3\}$), message space ($\mathcal{Y} = \{y_1, y_2\}$ with $y_1 = \{x_1, x_2\}$ and $y_2 = \{x_2, x_3\}$) and marginal distribution (p uniform on \mathcal{X}). In this table we have filled in a strategy P for the quizmaster in

P	x_1	x_2	x_3
y_1	1/3	1/6	—
y_2	—	1/6	1/3
p_x	1/3	1/3	1/3

(2)

the form of a joint distribution on pairs of x and y . The cells in the table where $x \notin y$ are marked with a dash to indicate that P may not assign positive probability there. The probabilities in each column sum to the marginal probabilities at the bottom, so this joint distribution P has the correct marginal distribution on the outcomes. For this particular strategy, if the true outcome is x_2 , the quizmaster will give message y_1 or y_2 to the contestant with equal probability.

More formally, write $\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})$ as an abbreviation for the set of pairs $\{(x, y) \mid y \in \mathcal{Y}, x \in y\}$. In the case of the Monty Hall game, there are four such pairs: $\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}) = \{(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_1), (x_2, y_2), (x_3, y_2)\}$. The notation $\mathbf{R}_{\geq 0}^{\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})}$ represents the set of all functions from $\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})$ to $\mathbf{R}_{\geq 0}$. If P is an element of this set and $(x, y) \in \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})$, the value of P at (x, y) is denoted by $P(x, y)$. For (x, y) with $x \notin y$, the notation $P(x, y)$ does not correspond to a value of the function, but is taken to be 0.

We again identify the elements of $\mathbf{R}_{\geq 0}^{\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})}$ with vectors. Thus the mass function P shown in (2) is identified with a four-element vector $(1/3, 1/6, 1/6, 1/3)$. (We could have chosen a different ordering instead.)

We define the set \mathcal{P} of strategies for the quizmaster as $\{P \in \mathbf{R}_{\geq 0}^{\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})} \mid \sum_{y \ni x} P(x, y) = p_x \text{ for all } x\}$; this is a convex set. The set of strategies for the contestant is $\mathcal{Q} := \Delta_{\mathcal{X}}^{\mathcal{Y}} = \{(Q_y)_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \mid Q_y \in \Delta_{\mathcal{X}} \text{ for each } y \in \mathcal{Y}\}$.

For given strategies P and Q , the expected loss the contestant incurs (1) is

$$\sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} p_x \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}: x \in y} P(y \mid x) L(x, Q_y) = \mathbf{E}_{X \sim P} \mathbf{E}_{Y \sim P(\cdot \mid X)} L(X, Q_{|Y}) = \mathbf{E}_{(X, Y) \sim P} L(X, Q_{|Y}). \quad (3)$$

We allow L to take the value ∞ ; if this value occurs with positive probability, then the contestant's expected loss is infinite. However, for terms where the probability is zero, we define $0 \cdot \infty = 0$, as is consistent with measure-theoretic probability.

We model the probability updating problem as a zero-sum game between two players with objective (3): the quizmaster chooses $P \in \mathcal{P}$ to maximize (3), while simultaneously (that is, without knowing P) the contestant chooses $Q \in \mathcal{Q}$ to minimize that quantity. The game $(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, p, L)$ is common knowledge for the two players.

If the contestant knew the quizmaster's strategy, he would pick a strategy Q that for each y minimizes the expected loss of predicting x given y . When the contestant receives a message and knows the distribution $P \in \Delta_{\mathcal{X}}$ over the outcomes given that message, this expected loss is written as

$$H_L(P) := \inf_{Q \in \Delta_{\mathcal{X}}} \sum_x P(x) L(x, Q) = \inf_{Q \in \Delta_{\mathcal{X}}} \mathbf{E}_{X \sim P} L(X, Q). \quad (4)$$

This is the *generalized entropy* of P for loss function L [14]. (Note that in the preceding display, P and Q are not strategies but simply distributions over \mathcal{X} .) If the contestant picks his strategy Q this way, (3) becomes the *expected generalized entropy* of the quizmaster's strategy $P \in \mathcal{P}$:

$$\sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} P(y) H_L(P(\cdot \mid y)), \quad (5)$$

where we again define terms with $P(y) = 0$ as 0. We say a strategy P is *worst-case optimal for the quizmaster* if it maximizes this expected generalized entropy over all

$P \in \mathcal{P}$. We call the version of the game where the quizmaster has to play first the *maximin* game, where the order of the words ‘max’ and ‘min’ reflects the order in which they appear in the expression for the value of this game as well as the order in which the maximizing and minimizing players take their turns.

Similarly, if the contestant were to play first (the *minimax* game), his goal might be to find a strategy Q that minimizes his worst-case expected loss

$$\max_{P \in \mathcal{P}} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{Y}} P(x, y) L(x, Q|_y) = \max_{P \in \mathcal{P}} \mathbf{E}_{(X, Y) \sim P} L(X, Q|_Y). \quad (6)$$

(In this case, the maximum is always achieved so we can write max rather than sup: for each x , the quizmaster can choose P that puts all mass on a $y \ni x$ with the maximum loss.) We call a strategy *worst-case optimal for the contestant* if it achieves the minimum of (6).

It is an elementary result from game theory that if worst-case optimal strategies P^* and Q^* exist for the two players, their expected losses are related by

$$\sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} P^*(y) H_L(P^*(\cdot | y)) \leq \max_{P \in \mathcal{P}} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{Y}} P(x, y) L(x, Q^*_y) \quad (7)$$

[17, Lemma 36.1: “maximin \leq minimax”]. The inequality expresses that in a sequential game where one of the players knows the other’s strategy before choosing his own, the player to move second may have an advantage.

In the next section, we will see that in many probability updating games, worst-case optimal strategies for both players exist (but may not be unique), and the maximum expected generalized entropy *equals* the minimum worst-case expected loss:

$$\sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} P^*(y) H_L(P^*(\cdot | y)) = \max_{P \in \mathcal{P}} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{Y}} P(x, y) L(x, Q^*_y). \quad (8)$$

When this is the case, we say that the minimax theorem holds [18, 19]. We remark here that our setting, while a zero-sum game, differs from the usual setting of zero-sum games in some respects: We consider possibly infinite loss and (in general) infinite sets of strategies available to the players, but do not allow the players to randomize over these strategies. Randomizing over \mathcal{P} would not give the quizmaster an advantage, as \mathcal{P} is convex and he could just play the corresponding convex combination directly; because (3) is linear in P , this results in the same expected loss. (Another way to view this is that, essentially, the quizmaster *is* randomizing, over a finite set of strategies.) For the contestant, \mathcal{Q} is also convex, but in general (depending on L), playing a convex combination of strategies does not correspond to randomizing over those strategies. The two do correspond in the case of randomized 0-1 loss, where L is linear. If L is convex, then playing the convex combination is at least as good for him as randomizing (and if L is strictly convex, better), so allowing randomization would again not give an advantage.

When (8) holds, any pair of worst-case optimal strategies (P^*, Q^*) forms a (*pure strategy*) *Nash equilibrium*, a concept introduced by Nash [20]: neither player can benefit from deviating from their worst-case optimal strategy if the other player leaves

his strategy unchanged. This means that the definitions of worst-case optimality given above are also meaningful in the game we are actually interested in, where the players move simultaneously in the sense that neither knows the other's strategy when choosing his own.

2.2. Three standard loss functions

Three commonly used loss functions are logarithmic loss, Brier loss, and randomized 0-1 loss. These are defined as follows [14]:

Logarithmic loss is a strictly proper loss function, given by

$$L(x, Q) = -\log Q(x).$$

Its entropy is the Shannon entropy $H_L(P) = \sum_x -P(x) \log P(x)$. The functions L and H_L are displayed in Figure 2a for the case of a binary prediction (i.e. a prediction between two possible outcomes). The (three-dimensional) graph of H_L for the case of three outcomes will appear in Figure 3 on page 16.

Brier loss is another strictly proper loss function, corresponding to squared Euclidean distance:

$$L(x, Q) = \sum_{x' \in \mathcal{X}} (\mathbf{1}_{x'=x} - Q(x'))^2 = (1 - Q(x))^2 + \sum_{x' \in \mathcal{X}, x' \neq x} Q(x')^2.$$

Its entropy function is $H_L(P) = 1 - \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} P(x)^2$; L and H_L are displayed in Figure 2b for a binary prediction. Note that for 3 outcomes and beyond, the Brier loss on outcome x is not simply a function of $Q(x)$, it depends on the entire distribution Q .


The third loss function we will often refer to is *randomized 0-1 loss*, given by

$$L(x, Q) = 1 - Q(x).$$


It is improper: an optimal response Q to some distribution P puts all mass on outcome(s) with maximum $P(x)$. Its entropy function is $H_L(P) = 1 - \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} P(x)$ (see Figure 2c). It is related to *hard 0-1 loss*, which requires the contestant to pick a single outcome x' and gives loss 0 if $x' = x$ and 1 otherwise. Randomized 0-1 loss essentially allows the contestant to randomize his prediction: $L(x, Q)$ equals the expected value of hard 0-1 loss when x' is distributed according to Q . An important difference between games with hard and randomized 0-1 loss will be shown later in Example F.

2.3. On duplicate messages and outcomes


Our definition of a game rules out duplicate messages in \mathcal{Y} , which would not meaningfully change the options of either player as the two messages represent the same move for the quizmaster; this will be made precise in Lemma 2. The definition does allow duplicate outcomes: pairs of outcomes $x_1, x_2 \in \mathcal{X}$ such that $x_1 \in y$ if and only if $x_2 \in y$ for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. We will see later (in Example D) that games with such outcomes cannot generally be solved in terms of games without, and thus we must analyse them in their own right.



(a) Logarithmic loss (natural base)



(b) Brier loss



(c) Randomized 0-1 loss

Figure 2: Three standard loss functions on a binary prediction. The left figures show the loss $L(x, Q)$ when probability $Q(x)$ is assigned to true outcome $x \in \{0, 1\}$. The right figures show the entropy $H_L(P)$.

Table 1: Results on worst-case optimal strategies for different loss functions

Conditions on L	Results	Example
H_L finite and continuous	P^* exists and is characterized by Theorem 3	hard 0-1 loss
H_L finite and continuous; all minimal supporting hyperplanes realizable	Q^* exists and a Nash equilibrium exists by Theorem 5; Q^* characterized by Theorem 7	randomized 0-1 loss
L proper and continuous; H_L finite and continuous	all the above simplified by Theorem 9	Brier loss
L local and proper; H_L finite and continuous	characterization of P^* simplified further by Theorem 10 (RCAR condition)	logarithmic loss

3. Worst-case optimal strategies

In this section, we present characterization theorems that allow worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster and contestant to be recognized for a large class of loss functions. In order to be applicable to a wide range of loss functions, this section is rather technical, and the characterizations of worst-case optimal strategies we find here are not always easy to use (though the abstract results in these sections are illustrated by concrete examples in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.3). We will find simpler characterizations for smaller classes of loss functions in Section 4. An overview of these results is given in Table 1.

We will need the following properties of H_L throughout our theory:

Lemma 1. *For all loss functions L , if H_L is finite, then it is also concave and lower semi-continuous. If L is finite everywhere, then H_L is finite, concave, and continuous.*

(When we talk about (semi-)continuity, this is always with respect to the extended real line topology of losses, as in Rockafellar [17, Section 7].)

3.1. Worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster

We start by studying the probability updating game from the perspective of the quizmaster. Using just the concavity of the quizmaster's objective (5) (which is a linear combination of concave generalized entropies), we can prove the following intuitive result.

Lemma 2 (Message subsumption). *Suppose that for $P \in \mathcal{P}$ there are two messages $y_1, y_2 \in \mathcal{Y}$ such that any outcome $x \in y_2$ with $P(x, y_2) > 0$ is also in y_1 . Then if H_L is concave, the quizmaster can do at least as well without using y_2 . More precisely, P'*

given by

$$P'(x, y) = \begin{cases} P(x, y_1) + P(x, y_2) & \text{for } y = y_1; \\ 0 & \text{for } y = y_2; \\ P(x, y) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

is also in \mathcal{P} and its expected generalized entropy is at least as large as that of P . In particular, if P is worst-case optimal, then so is P' .

In particular, if $y_1 \supset y_2$, any strategy P can be replaced by a strategy P' with $P'(y_2) = 0$ without making things worse for the quizmaster. Thus the quizmaster, who wants to maximize the contestant's expected loss, never needs to use a message that is contained in another.

A *dominating hyperplane* to a function f from $D \subseteq \mathbf{R}^X$ to \mathbf{R} is a hyperplane in $\mathbf{R}^X \times \mathbf{R}$ that is nowhere below f . A *supporting hyperplane* to f (at P) is a dominating hyperplane that touches f at some point P .² A concave function has at least one supporting hyperplane at every point [17, Theorem 11.6], but it may be vertical. A nonvertical hyperplane can be described by a linear function $\ell : \mathbf{R}^X \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$: $\ell(P) = \alpha + \sum_x P(x)\lambda_x$, where $\alpha \in \mathbf{R}$ and $\lambda \in \mathbf{R}^X$.

While H_L is defined as a function on Δ_X , we will often need to talk about supporting hyperplanes to the function H_L restricted to Δ_y for some message $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. We use the notation $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ for the restriction of H_L to the domain Δ_y . (Recall that we defined Δ_y as a subset of Δ_X .) A supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ is not a supporting hyperplane to H_L itself if it goes below H_L at some $P \in \Delta_X \setminus \Delta_y$.

A *supergradient* is a generalization of the gradient: a supergradient of a concave function at a point is the gradient of a supporting hyperplane. If $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ is finite and continuous (and thus concave by Lemma 1), then for any vector $\lambda \in \mathbf{R}^X$, a unique supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ can be found having that vector as its gradient, by choosing α appropriately in $\ell(P) = \alpha + \sum_x P(x)\lambda_x$ [17, Theorem 27.3]. It will often be convenient in our discussion to talk about supporting hyperplanes rather than supergradients because they fix this choice of α .

Theorem 3 (Existence and characterization of P^*). *For H_L finite and upper semi-continuous (thus continuous), a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster (that is, a $P \in \mathcal{P}$ maximizing (5)) exists, and P^* is such a strategy if and only if there exists a $\lambda^* \in \mathbf{R}^X$ such that*

$$H_L(P') \leq \sum_{x \in \mathcal{Y}} P'(x)\lambda_x^* \quad \text{for all } y \in \mathcal{Y} \text{ and } P' \in \Delta_y,$$

with equality if $P^*(y) > 0$ and $P' = P^*(\cdot \mid y)$. That is, for y with $P^*(y) > 0$, the linear function $\sum_{x \in \mathcal{Y}} P(x)\lambda_x^*$ defines a supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at $P^*(\cdot \mid y)$, and a dominating hyperplane for other y .

A vector $\lambda^* \in \mathbf{R}^X$ that satisfies the above for some worst-case optimal P^* satisfies it for all worst-case optimal P^* and is called a Kuhn-Tucker vector (or KT-vector).

²We deviate slightly from standard terminology here: what we call a supporting hyperplane to a concave function f is usually called a supporting hyperplane to $\{(u, v) \in \mathbf{R}^X \times \mathbf{R} \mid v \leq f(u)\}$, the hypograph of f .

Section 3.1.1 includes several examples illustrating the application of Theorem 3; a graphical illustration of the theorem is also included there (Figure 3). We will see in Section 3.2 that KT-vectors form the bridge between worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster and for the contestant.

3.1.1. Application to standard loss functions

The generalized entropy for logarithmic loss has only vertical supporting hyperplanes at the boundary of Δ_y for any $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. These hyperplanes do not correspond to any KT-vector $\lambda^* \in \mathbf{R}^X$, from which it follows that for any y with $P^*(y) > 0$, the worst-case optimal strategy will not have $P^*(\cdot | y)$ at the boundary of Δ_y . The same is not generally true: we will see below how for randomized 0-1 loss (in Example B on page 15, and Example D) and Brier loss (in Example E), games may have a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster that has $P^*(y) > 0$, yet $P^*(x | y) = 0$ for some $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, $x \in y$.

Of the three loss functions we saw earlier, Brier loss and 0-1 loss are finite, so by Lemma 1, all conditions of Theorem 3 are satisfied for them. Logarithmic loss is infinite when the obtained outcome was predicted to have probability zero. The generalized entropy is still finite, because for any true distribution P , there exist predictions Q that give finite expected loss (in particular, $Q = P$ does this). The entropy is also continuous: $-P(x) \log P(x)$ is continuous as a function of $P(x)$ with our convention that $0 \cdot \infty = 0$, and H_L is the sum of such continuous functions. Thus we can apply Theorem 3 to analyse the Monty Hall problem for each of these three loss functions.

Example B (continued). For Monty Hall, the strategy P^* of choosing a message uniformly when the true outcome is x_2 is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster, for all three loss functions. It is easy to verify that the theorem is satisfied by this strategy combined with the appropriate KT-vector:

$$\text{for logarithmic loss: } \lambda^* = \left(-\log \frac{2}{3}, -\log \frac{1}{3}, -\log \frac{2}{3} \right);$$

$$\text{for Brier loss: } \lambda^* = \left(\frac{2}{9}, \frac{8}{9}, \frac{2}{9} \right);$$

$$\text{for randomized 0-1 loss: } \lambda^* = (0, 1, 0).$$

The situation for logarithmic loss is illustrated in Figure 3.

We also find that for logarithmic loss and Brier loss, P^* is the unique worst-case optimal strategy, as the hyperplanes specified by λ^* touch the generalized entropy functions at only one point each. For randomized 0-1 loss, on the other hand, all quizmaster strategies are worst-case optimal, as the hyperplane specified by λ^* touches $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_{y_1}$ at all $P(\cdot | y_1)$ with $P(x_1 | y_1) \geq 1/2$.




Figure 3: The worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster in the Monty Hall game with logarithmic loss, as characterized by Theorem 3. The triangular base is the full simplex Δ_X , on which the entropy function H_L is defined (this is the grey dome); the points labelled x_1 , x_2 and x_3 are the elements of this simplex putting all mass on that single outcome; and the line segments Δ_{y_1} and Δ_{y_2} are the subsets of Δ_X consisting of all distributions supported on y_1 and y_2 respectively. Restricted to the domain Δ_{y_1} , the vector λ^* defines a linear function (having height λ_x^* at each $x \in X$) that is a supporting hyperplane to H_L at $P^*(\cdot | y_1)$ (and similar for y_2). Note that when the linear function defined by λ^* is extended to all of Δ_X , it may go below H_L there, but not in Δ_{y_1} or Δ_{y_2} .

Example C (The quizmaster discards a message).

Consider a different game, with $\mathcal{X} = \{x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4\}$, $\mathcal{Y} = \{\{x_1, x_2\}, \{x_2, x_3\}, \{x_3, x_4\}\}$, p given by $p_{x_4} = 2/5$ and $p_x = 1/5$ elsewhere, and L logarithmic loss. In the terminology of the Monty Hall puzzle, there is no initial choice by the contestant that determines what

P	x_1	x_2	x_3	x_4
y_1	1/5	1/5	–	–
y_2	–	0	0	–
y_3	–	–	1/5	2/5
p_x	1/5	1/5	1/5	2/5

moves are available to the quizmaster, but the quizmaster will again leave two doors closed: the one hiding the car, and another adjacent to it. Then one strategy for the quizmaster is to never give message y_2 to the contestant; i.e. to pick the strategy $P \in \mathcal{P}$ with $P(y_2) = 0$ shown to the right. The depicted strategy P is worst-case optimal: When applying the theorem, we see that the KT-vector $\lambda^* = (\log 2, \log 2, \log 3, -\log(2/3))$ gives supporting hyperplanes to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_{y_1}$ and $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_{y_3}$, but a non-supporting dominating hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_{y_2}$. This strategy can be seen to be intuitively reasonable because when the contestant receives message $y_3 = \{x_3, x_4\}$, he knows that the probability of the true outcome being x_4 is at least twice as large as the probability of it being x_3 . By always giving message y_3 when the true outcome is x_3 , the quizmaster can keep this difference from becoming larger.

P is also the unique worst-case optimal strategy for Brier loss (as shown by the same analysis) and for randomized 0-1 loss (where the KT-vector is not unique: $(a, 1-a, 1, 0)$ for any $a \in [0, 1]$ is a KT-vector).

In the previous examples, the worst-case optimal strategies P coincided for logarithmic and Brier loss. The following example shows that this is not always the case.

Example D (Dependence on loss function). Consider the family of games with $\mathcal{X} = \{x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4\}$, $\mathcal{Y} = \{\{x_1, x_2\}, \{x_2, x_3, x_4\}\}$, $p_{x_1} = p_{x_2} = 1/3$, and $p_{x_3} = p_{x_4} = 1/6$: This game is also similar to Monty Hall, but now one door has been ‘split in two’: the quizmaster will either open door 1, or doors 3 and 4. The

P	x_1	x_2	x_3	x_4
y_1	1/3	1/6	–	–
y_2	–	1/6	1/6	1/6
p_x	1/3	1/3	1/6	1/6

strategy P shown to the right is worst-case optimal for logarithmic loss, but not for Brier loss: for both loss functions, there is a unique supporting hyperplane for both y that touches $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at $P(\cdot \mid y)$ for P as shown in the table, but for Brier loss, these two hyperplanes do not have the same height at the common outcome x_2 . (Using Theorem 9 from page 22, we can find the worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster under Brier loss by solving a quadratic equation with one unknown; this strategy has $P(x_2, y_1) = 11/3 - 2\sqrt{3} \approx 0.20$ and $P(x_2, y_2) = 2\sqrt{3} - 10/3 \approx 0.13$.)

For randomized 0-1 loss, neither the worst-case optimal strategy nor the KT-vector are unique: the KT-vectors are $(0, 1, a, 1-a)$ for any $a \in [0, 1]$; the worst-case optimal strategies are the P given above, the strategy that always gives message y_1 when the true outcome is x_2 , and all convex combinations of these.

Example E (The quizmaster discards a message-outcome pair). Again consider the game from the previous example, but now with a different marginal as shown to the right. The strategy P is worst-case optimal for Brier loss, with KT-vector

P	x_1	x_2	x_3	x_4
y_1	0.45	0.05	–	–
y_2	–	0	0.25	0.25
p_x	0.45	0.05	0.25	0.25

$$\lambda^* = (0.02, 1.62, 0.5, 0.5).$$

P displays another curious property (that we also saw for randomized 0-1 loss in the previous example): while the quizmaster uses message y_2 for some outcomes, he does not use it in combination with outcome x_2 . In the theorem, the hyperplane on Δ_{y_2} is supporting at $P(\cdot | y_2)$, but is not a tangent plane: compared to the tangent plane, it has been ‘lifted up’ at the opposite vertex of the simplex $\Delta_{y_2}(x_2)$ to the same height as the supporting hyperplane on Δ_{y_1} .

This behaviour cannot occur in games with logarithmic loss: as we observed at the beginning of Section 3.1.1, if a worst-case optimal strategy P^* has $P^*(y) > 0$ for some $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, then it must assign positive probability to $P^*(x | y)$ for all $x \in \mathcal{X}$.

3.2. Worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant

We now turn our attention to worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant. To this end, we look at the relation between the KT-vectors that appeared in Theorem 3 and the set of strategies \mathcal{Q} the contestant can choose from.

3.2.1. Realizable hyperplanes

For any $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, Δ_y is defined in Section 2 as a $(|y| - 1)$ -dimensional subset of $\mathbf{R}_{\geq 0}^{\mathcal{X}}$. Thus a linear function $\ell : \Delta_y \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$ can be extended to a linear function $\bar{\ell}$ on the domain $\mathbf{R}_{\geq 0}^{\mathcal{X}}$ in different ways. Hence many different vectors $\lambda \in \mathbf{R}^{\mathcal{X}}$ representing supporting hyperplanes will correspond to what we can view as a single supergradient, because the hyperplanes agree on Δ_y . We can make the extension unique by requiring $\bar{\ell}$ to be zero at the origin and at the vertices of the simplex $\Delta_{\mathcal{X} \setminus y}$. Because such a normalized function $\bar{\ell} : \mathbf{R}_{\geq 0}^{\mathcal{X}} \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$ obeys $\bar{\ell}(0) = 0$, it can be written as $\bar{\ell}(P) = P^\top \lambda$ for some λ . These functions are thus uniquely identified by their gradients λ , allowing us to refer to them using ‘the (supporting) hyperplane λ ’. Let Λ_y be the set of all gradients of such normalized functions that represent dominating hyperplanes to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$; in formula, let

$$\Lambda_y = \{\lambda \in \mathbf{R}^{\mathcal{X}} \mid \lambda_x = 0 \text{ for } x \notin y, \text{ and } \forall P \in \Delta_y : P^\top \lambda \geq H_L(P)\}.$$

For each nonvertical supporting hyperplane of $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$, clearly the gradient is in Λ_y ; that is, all finite supergradients of this restricted function have a normalized representative in Λ_y . The set also includes vectors λ for which $P^\top \lambda > H_L(P)$ for all $P \in \Delta_y$, which do not correspond to supporting hyperplanes.

Not all vectors $\lambda \in \Lambda_y$ may be available to the contestant as responses to a play of $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ by the quizmaster. As a trivial example, consider logarithmic loss and a vector λ with $\sum_{x \in y} e^{-\lambda_x} < 1$ and $\lambda_x = 0$ for $x \notin y$. Then $\lambda \in \Lambda_y$ because the hyperplane defined by λ is dominating to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ (thus the expected loss from λ is *larger* than what the contestant could achieve), but clearly there is no distribution $Q \in \Delta_{\mathcal{X}}$ that results in

these losses on $x \in y$. We say that a vector $\lambda \in \Lambda_y$ is *realizable on y* if there exists a $Q \in \Delta_X$ such that $L(x, Q) = \lambda_x$ for all $x \in y$, and then we say that such a Q *realizes* λ .

A partial order on vectors $\lambda, \lambda' \in \mathbf{R}^X$ is given by: $\lambda \leq \lambda'$ if and only if $\lambda_x \leq \lambda'_x$ for all $x \in X$. We write $\lambda < \lambda'$ when $\lambda \leq \lambda'$ and $\lambda \neq \lambda'$. For all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, this partial order has the following property: For $\lambda, \lambda' \in \Lambda_y$, we have $\lambda \leq \lambda'$ if and only if for all $P \in \Delta_y$, $P^\top \lambda \leq P^\top \lambda'$ (since any linear function is maximized over the simplex at a vertex). Therefore if $Q, Q' \in \Delta_X$ realize $\lambda, \lambda' \in \Lambda_y$ respectively and $\lambda \leq \lambda'$, the contestant is never hurt by using Q instead of Q' as a prediction given the message y .

Any minimal element with respect to this partial order defines a supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$. For P in the relative interior of Δ_y , the converse also holds: all supporting hyperplanes at P are minimal elements. This is not the case for P at the relative boundary of Δ_y , where some supporting hyperplanes (the ones that ‘tip over’ the boundary) are not minimal.

Lemma 4. *If H_L is finite and continuous on Δ_y , then the following hold:*

1. *If $\lambda \in \Lambda_y$ is not a supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$, then there exists a supporting hyperplane $\lambda' \in \Lambda_y$ with $\lambda' < \lambda$;*
2. *If $\lambda \in \Lambda_y$ is a supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at P but is not minimal in Λ_y , then there exists a minimal $\lambda' < \lambda$ in Λ_y ;*
3. *If $\lambda \in \Lambda_y$ is a supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at P , then any $\lambda' \leq \lambda$ in Λ_y is a supporting hyperplane at P and obeys $\lambda'_x = \lambda_x$ for all $x \in y$ with $P(x) > 0$.*

Thus the contestant never needs to play a $Q|_y$ realizing a non-minimal element of Λ_y .

3.2.2. Existence

With the help of Lemma 4, we can formulate sufficient conditions for the existence of a worst-case optimal strategy Q^* for the contestant that, together with P^* for the quizmaster, forms a Nash equilibrium.

Theorem 5 (Existence of Q^*). *Suppose that H_L is finite and continuous and that for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, all minimal supporting hyperplanes $\lambda \in \Lambda_y$ to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ are realizable on y . Then there exists a worst-case optimal strategy $Q^* \in \mathcal{Q}$ for the contestant that achieves the same expected loss in the minimax game as P^* achieves in the maximin game: (P^*, Q^*) is a Nash equilibrium.*

We will see in Theorem 9 that a (or rather, at least one) Nash equilibrium exists for logarithmic loss and Brier loss. The existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with randomized 0-1 loss is shown by the following consequence of Theorem 5.

Proposition 6. *In games with randomized 0-1 loss, a Nash equilibrium exists.*

The following example shows what may go wrong if some supporting hyperplanes are not realizable.

Example F (Hard 0-1 loss). Consider the game with \mathcal{X} , \mathcal{Y} and p as shown in the table, and with hard 0-1 loss (so that the contestant is not allowed to randomize):

$$L(x, Q) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } Q(x) = 1; \\ 1 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

P^*	x_1	x_2	x_3
y_1	1/6	1/6	—
y_2	—	1/6	1/6
y_3	1/6	—	1/6
p_x	1/3	1/3	1/3

This loss function has the same entropy function as randomized 0-1 loss, so the two loss functions are the same from the quizmaster's perspective. The table shows the unique worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster, with KT-vector $\lambda^* = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2)$ and expected loss 1/2. For randomized 0-1 loss, the (as we will see below: unique) worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant would be to respond to any message y with the uniform distribution on y . However, for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, λ given by $\lambda_x = \mathbf{1}_{x \in y} \lambda_x^*$ is not realizable on y under hard 0-1 loss, so Theorem 5 does not apply. In fact, for any strategy Q the contestant might use, there exists a strategy P for the quizmaster that gives expected loss 2/3 or larger (because for at least two outcomes x , there must be a $y \ni x$ such that $L(x, Q_y) = 1$). Thus the inequality (7) is strict: there is no Nash equilibrium, and a worst-case optimal strategy for either player is optimal only in the minimax/maximin sense.

This example also shows that the condition on existence of supporting hyperplanes in Theorem 5 cannot be replaced by the weaker condition that the infimum appearing in the definition (4) of H_L is always attained.

Games without Nash equilibria. We will now briefly go into the situation seen in the preceding example, where Theorem 5 does not apply.

While for some games with L hard 0-1 loss, no Nash equilibrium may exist, worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant do exist, and can be characterized using stable sets of a graph. A *stable set* is a set of nodes no two of which are adjacent [21, Chapter 64]. Consider the graph with node set \mathcal{X} and with an edge between two nodes if and only if they occur together in some message. A set $S \subseteq \mathcal{X}$ is stable in this graph if and only if there exists a strategy $Q \in \mathcal{Q}$ for the contestant such that for all $x \in S$, $\max_{y \in \mathcal{Y}: x \in y} L(x, Q_y) = 0$, and equal to 1 otherwise. The worst-case loss obtained by this strategy is $1 - \sum_{x \in S} p_x$. Thus finding the worst-case optimal strategy Q for the contestant is equivalent to finding a stable set S with maximum weight. Algorithmically, this is an NP-hard problem in general, though polynomial-time algorithms exist for certain classes of graphs, including perfect (this includes bipartite) graphs and claw-free graphs [21].

With the exception of two examples in Section 4.1 illustrating the limits of our theory, we will not look at games without Nash equilibria any more from now on.

3.2.3. Characterization and nonuniqueness

The concept of a KT-vector, which helped characterize worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster in Theorem 3, now returns for a similar role in the characterization of worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant.

Theorem 7 (Characterization of Q^*). *Under the conditions of Theorem 5 (H_L finite and continuous, all minimal supporting hyperplanes realizable), a strategy $Q^* \in \mathcal{Q}$ is worst-case optimal for the contestant if and only if the vector given by $\lambda_x := \max_{y \ni x} L(x, Q^*_{|y})$ is a KT-vector.*

If the loss $L(x, Q^*_{|y})$ equals λ_x for all $x \in y$, then the worst-case optimal strategy Q^* is an equalizer strategy [19]: the expected loss of Q^* does not depend on the quizmaster's strategy. Not all games have an equalizer strategy as worst-case optimal strategy, as Example H below shows.

The following examples demonstrate that a worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant is in general not unique.

Example G (λ^* not unique). Consider the game with \mathcal{X} , \mathcal{Y} and p as in the table to the right, and with randomized 0-1 loss. For the quizmaster, any P^* that is uniform given each y is worst-case optimal, and any $\lambda_a = (a, 1-a, a, 1-a)$ with $a \in [0, 1]$ is a KT-vector. To each λ_a corresponds a unique worst-case optimal Q^* , namely the strategy that puts conditional probability $1-a$ on outcome x_1 or x_3 (whichever is in the given message), and probability a on x_2 or x_4 .

	x_1	x_2	x_3	x_4
y_1	*	*	—	—
y_2	—	*	*	—
y_3	—	—	*	*
y_4	*	—	—	*
p_x	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4

Note that if we replace randomized 0-1 loss by a strictly proper loss function such as logarithmic or Brier loss, the KT-vector and the worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant become unique, while the same set of strategies as before continues to be worst-case optimal for the quizmaster. This shows that the freedom for the contestant we see here for randomized 0-1 loss is due to the nonuniqueness of the KT-vector, not due to the nonuniqueness of P^* .

Example H (Minimal λ not unique). Consider the game as shown in the table with logarithmic loss; the strategy P^* shown in this table is the unique worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster. Because logarithmic loss is proper, we know that $Q^*_{|y_1} = P^*(\cdot | y_1)$ and $Q^*_{|y_2} = P^*(\cdot | y_2)$ are optimal responses for the contestant, but this does not tell us what $Q^*_{|y_3}$ should be in a worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant.

P^*	x_1	x_2	x_3
y_1	1/5	3/10	—
y_2	—	3/10	1/5
y_3	0	—	0
p_x	1/5	3/5	1/5

We see that P^* assigns probability zero to message y_3 , and the KT-vector

$$\lambda^* = (-\log \frac{2}{5}, -\log \frac{3}{5}, -\log \frac{2}{5})$$

specifies a hyperplane that does not support H_L in Δ_{y_3} . Hence the construction of $Q^*_{|y_3}$ in the proof of Theorem 5 allows freedom in the choice of a minimal element $\lambda \in \Lambda_{y_3}$ less than $(-\log 2/5, 0, -\log 2/5)$: the valid choices are $(-\log q, 0, -\log(1-q))$ for any $q \in [2/5, 3/5]$; each of these is realized on y_3 by $Q^*_{|y_3} = (q, 0, 1-q)$. Using Theorem 7, we can verify that these choices of $Q^*_{|y_3}$ define worst-case optimal strategies: the vector λ defined there equals the KT-vector λ^* given above.

This also shows that worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant cannot be characterized simply as ‘optimal responses to P^* ’: in this example, $P^*(\cdot \mid y_3)$ is undefined, yet there is a nontrivial constraint on Q_{y_3} in the worst-case optimal strategy Q for the contestant.

4. Results for well-behaved loss functions

In the preceding sections, we have established characterization results for the worst-case optimal strategies of both players. While these results are applicable to many loss functions, they have the disadvantage of being complicated, involving supporting hyperplanes. For some common loss functions, simpler characterizations can be given.

4.1. Proper continuous loss functions

Recall from page 8 that for a *proper* loss function, the contestant’s expected loss for a given message is minimized if his predicted probabilities equal the true probabilities. Such loss functions are natural to consider in our probability updating game, as our goal will often be to find these true probabilities. However, simplifying our theorems requires further restrictions on the class of loss functions. In this subsection, we consider loss functions that are both proper and continuous.

Lemma 8. *If the loss function $L(x, Q)$ is proper and continuous as a function of Q for all x and H_L is finite, then H_L is differentiable in the following sense: for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ and all $P \in \Delta_y$, there is at most one element of Λ_y that is a minimal supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at P ; if P is in the relative interior of Δ_y , there is exactly one. If it exists, the minimal supporting hyperplane at P is realized by $Q_y = P$.*

The uniqueness of minimal supporting hyperplanes in Λ_y is equivalent to there being exactly one equivalence class of supergradients, where supergradients are taken to be equivalent if their corresponding supporting hyperplanes coincide on Δ_y . The property shown in the above lemma is then related to differentiability by Rockafellar [17, Theorem 25.1], which says that for a finite, concave function such as H_L , uniqueness of the supergradient at P is equivalent to differentiability at P .

Theorem 9. *For L proper and continuous and H_L finite and continuous,*

1. *worst-case optimal strategies for both players exist and form a Nash equilibrium;*
2. *there is a unique KT-vector;*
3. *a strategy $P^* \in \mathcal{P}$ for the quizmaster is worst-case optimal if and only if there exists $\lambda^* \in \mathbf{R}^X$ such that*

$$\begin{aligned} L(x, P^*(\cdot \mid y)) &= \lambda_x^* && \text{for all } x \in y \text{ with } P^*(x, y) > 0, \\ L(x, P^*(\cdot \mid y)) &\leq \lambda_x^* && \text{for all } x \in y \text{ with } P^*(x, y) = 0, P^*(y) > 0, \text{ and} \\ \exists Q_y^* : L(x, Q_y^*) &\leq \lambda_x^* && \text{for all } x \in y \text{ with } P^*(y) = 0; \end{aligned}$$

4. a strategy Q^* for the contestant is worst-case optimal if and only if there exists a worst-case optimal P^* such that for all x ,

$$\max_{y \ni x} L(x, Q^*_{|y}) = \max_{\substack{y \ni x, \\ P^*(y) > 0}} L(x, P^*(\cdot | y)), \quad (9)$$

which holds if and only if (9) holds for all worst-case optimal P^* .

Using this theorem, many observations made about logarithmic loss and Brier loss in the examples we have seen so far can now be more easily verified. For instance, in the worst-case optimal strategy we saw in Example E on page 18, we verify that $L(x_2, P^*(\cdot | y_2)) = 1.5 \leq 1.62 = \lambda^*_{x_2} = L(x_2, P^*(\cdot | y_1))$.

Theorem 9 requires that L is both proper and continuous. If either condition is removed then the conclusions of the theorem may fail to hold. Counterexamples for either case where no Nash equilibrium exists are given by Van Ommen [1, Examples 6.J and 6.K].

While uniqueness of λ^* was established by the theorem, we do not have uniqueness of P^* or Q^* . Multiple worst-case optimal strategies Q^* for the contestant may exist as soon as a message is unused, as in Example H. Multiple worst-case optimal strategies P^* for the quizmaster are also possible, even for strictly proper L : see Example G. The worst-case optimality criterion does not provide any guidance for selecting particular strategies in such cases. One might make use of symmetry and/or various kinds of limits to select a specific recommendation, or search for an analogue of subgame perfect equilibria. We will leave such interesting extensions to future research.

4.2. Local loss functions

Logarithmic loss is an example of a *local* loss function: a loss function where the loss $L(x, Q)$ depends on the probability assigned by the prediction Q to the obtained outcome x , but not on the probabilities assigned to outcomes that did not occur. The following theorem shows how for such loss functions, worst-case optimality of the quizmaster's strategy can be characterized purely in terms of probabilities, without converting them to losses.

Theorem 10 (Characterization of P^* for local L). *For L local and proper and H_L finite and continuous, $P^* \in \mathcal{P}$ is worst-case optimal if there exists a vector $q \in [0, 1]^X$ such that*

$$\begin{aligned} q_x &= P^*(x | y) \text{ for all } y \in \mathcal{Y}, x \in y \text{ with } P^*(y) > 0, \text{ and} \\ \sum_{x \in y} q_x &\leq 1 \text{ for all } y \in \mathcal{Y}. \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

If additionally $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ is strictly concave for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, only such P^ are worst-case optimal for L .*

Among loss functions that are 'smooth' for all x , logarithmic loss is, up to some transformations, the only proper local loss function [22]. We do not know what non-smooth local proper loss functions may exist. In particular, it is conceivable (yet unlikely) that a discontinuous L exists satisfying the conditions of Theorem 10, but not those of Theorem 9.

If L is also continuous, then Theorem 9 applies, and it follows that $Q^* \in \mathcal{Q}$ is a worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant if $Q_y^*(x) \geq q_x$ for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, $x \in y$. For strictly proper loss functions such as logarithmic loss, this fully characterizes the worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant.

Example H (continued). Consider again the game shown to the right with logarithmic loss. The conditionals $P^*(x | y)$ agree with the vector $q = (2/5, 3/5, 2/5)$. For all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ with $P^*(y) > 0$, this implies that $\sum_{x \in y} q_x = 1$; for y_3 , we see that this sum equals $4/5 \leq 1$. Thus P^* is verified to be worst-case optimal.

P^*	x_1	x_2	x_3
y_1	1/5	3/10	—
y_2	—	3/10	1/5
y_3	0	—	0
p_x	1/5	3/5	1/5

The equality of conditionals $P^*(x | y)$ with the same x in the statement of Theorem 10 is oddly similar to the CAR condition we saw in Section 1, but reversing the roles of outcomes and messages. We may say that a strategy P^* satisfying (10) is *RCAR* (sometimes *with vector q*), for ‘reverse CAR’. Note that whether a strategy is RCAR does not depend on the loss function.

A vector q is called an *RCAR vector* if a strategy $P^* \in \mathcal{P}$ exists such that P^* and q satisfy (10). This definition is also independent of the loss function. If q is an RCAR vector, then $q_x > 0$ for all $x \in \mathcal{X}$; otherwise we would get $P^*(x) = 0 < p_x$. Like the KT-vector λ^* in Theorem 9, the RCAR vector is unique:

Lemma 11. *Given $\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, p$, there exists a unique RCAR vector $q \in [0, 1]^{\mathcal{X}}$.*

If each message in \mathcal{Y} contains an outcome x not contained in any other message, then any strategy P^* must have $P^*(y) > 0$ for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. Then the first line of (10) implies that $\sum_{x \in y} q_x = 1$ for all y . Thus the second line is now satisfied automatically, allowing the theorem to be simplified for this case:

Corollary 12. *A strategy $P^* \in \mathcal{P}$ with $P^*(y) > 0$ for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ that satisfies*

$$P^*(x | y) = P^*(x | y') \text{ for all } y, y' \ni x \quad (11)$$

is worst-case optimal for the loss functions covered by Theorem 10

In this case, P^* is an equalizer strategy [19].

The symmetry between versions of CAR and RCAR is clearest in Corollary 12: the condition (11) is the mirror image of the definition of *strong CAR* in Jaeger [8]. Thus we may call it *strong RCAR*. Ordinary RCAR (10) imposes an inequality on q for messages with probability 0, which has no analogue in the CAR literature that we know of: the definition of *weak CAR* in [8] puts no requirement at all on outcomes with probability 0.

Strict concavity of H_L occurred as a new condition in Theorem 10. The main loss function of interest here is logarithmic loss, and its entropy is strictly concave. For other loss functions, the following lemma relates strict concavity of H_L to conditions we have seen before.

Lemma 13. *If L is strictly proper and all minimal supporting hyperplanes $\lambda \in \Delta_y$ to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ are realizable on y for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, then H_L is strictly concave on $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$.*

Affine transformations of the loss function. Previously, we mentioned that logarithmic loss is the only local proper loss function up to some transformations. The transformations considered in Bernardo [22] are affine transformations, of the form

$$L'(x, Q) = aL(x, Q) + b_x \quad (12)$$

for $a \in \mathbf{R}_{>0}$ and $b \in \mathbf{R}^{\mathcal{X}}$. (This transformation can result in a function L' that can take negative values, so that it does not satisfy our definition of a loss function. However, our results can easily be extended to loss functions bounded from below by an arbitrary real number, so we allow such transformations here.)

The following lemma shows that, for logarithmic loss as well as for other loss functions, the transformation (12) does not change how the players of the probability updating game should act.

Lemma 14. *Let L be a loss function for which H_L is finite and continuous, and let L' be an affine transformation of L as in (12). Then a strategy P^* is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster in the game $\mathcal{G}' := (X, \mathcal{Y}, p, L')$ if and only if P^* is worst-case optimal in $\mathcal{G} := (X, \mathcal{Y}, p, L)$. If \mathcal{G} also satisfies the conditions of Theorem 5, then the same equivalence holds for worst-case optimal strategies Q^* for the contestant.*

Lemma 14 has highly important implications when applied to the logarithmic loss. While multiplying logarithmic loss by a constant $a \neq 1$ merely corresponds to changing the base of the logarithm, *adding* constants b_x allows the logarithmic loss to become the appropriate loss function for a very wide class of games. This means that the RCAR characterization of worst-case optimal strategies for logarithmic loss is also valid for all these games. We are referring to so-called *Kelly gambling* games, also known as *horse race games* [23] in the literature. In such games (with terminology adapted to our setting), for any outcome x the contestant can buy a ticket which costs $\text{€}1$ and which pays off a positive amount $\text{€}c_x$ if x actually obtains; if some $x' \neq x$ is realized, nothing is paid so the $\text{€}1$ is lost. The contestant is allowed to distribute his capital over several tickets (outcomes), and he is also allowed to buy a fractional nonnegative number of tickets. For example, if $\mathcal{X} = \{1, 2\}$ and $c_1 = c_2 = 2$, then the contestant is guaranteed to neither win nor lose any money if he splits his capital fifty-fifty over both outcomes.

Now consider a contestant with some initial capital (say, $\text{€}1$), who faces an i.i.d. sequence $(X_1, Y_1), (X_2, Y_2), \dots \sim P$ of outcomes in $\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$. At each point in time i he observes ‘side information’ $Y_i = y_i$ and he distributes his capital gained so far over all $x \in \mathcal{X}$, putting some fraction $Q_{y_i}(x)$ of his capital on outcome x . Then he is paid out according to the x_i that was actually realized. Here each Q_{y_i} is a probability distribution over \mathcal{X} , i.e. for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, all $x \in \mathcal{X}$, $Q_{y_i}(x) \geq 0$ and $\sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} Q_{y_i}(x) = 1$. So if his capital was U_i before the i -th round, it will be $U_i \cdot Q_{y_i}(x_i)c_{x_i}$ after the i -th round. By the law of large numbers, his capital will grow (or shrink, depending on the odds on offer) almost surely exponentially fast, with exponent $\mathbf{E}_{X,Y \sim P}[\log Q_Y(X)c_X] = \mathbf{E}_{X,Y \sim P}[\log Q_Y(X) - b_X]$, where $b_x = -\log c_x$ [23, Chapter 6]. Thus, the contestant’s capital will grow fastest, among all constant strategies and against an adversarial distribution $P \in \mathcal{P}$, if he plays a worst-case optimal strategy for gains $\log Q(x) - b_x$, i.e. for loss function $L'(x, Q) = -\log Q(x) + b_x$. By Lemma 14 above, this worst-case optimal strategy Q^* is just the Q^* that is also worst-case optimal for logarithmic loss — *it does not depend*

on the pay-offs ('odds' in the horse race interpretation) c_x . Clearly, if data are i.i.d. then this continues to hold even if the pay-offs are allowed to change over time, and even if the contestant is allowed to use different strategies at different time points: the worst-case optimal capital growth rate is always achieved by choosing Q^* at all time points.

The upshot is that whenever (a) the probability updating game is played repeatedly, and (b) the contestant is allowed to reinvest and redistribute his capital over all outcomes at each point in time, then his worst-case optimal strategy is equal to the worst-case optimal Q^* for logarithmic loss *irrespective of the pay-offs*. This makes the logarithmic loss, and hence the RCAR characterization, appropriate for a very wide class of settings.

5. The RCAR characterization for general loss functions

Our results so far have focused on properties of the loss function L . This section will focus on understanding a game's message structure \mathcal{Y} . For the purpose of summarizing our main theorems in simplified form, we restrict attention to irreducible games. Those are games which are connected (a game is disconnected if the outcome space can be partitioned such that each message is contained within one of the parts) and contain no dominated messages (a message is dominated if it is a strict subset of another message). We say that a game is a *graph game* (Section 5.3) if all its messages are binary, and we call it a *matroid game* (Section 5.4) if its messages satisfy the *basis exchange* property [24, Corollary 1.2.5] detailed below. The abstract matroid property holds for a rich class of games, including e.g. *negation games*, where each message excludes a single outcome. Monty Hall (Example B) is both a graph and a matroid game. We also need a mild condition on loss functions. We call a loss function *regular* if it is invariant under permutations of the outcomes, and has finite and continuous associated entropy function H_L .

To solve a quizmaster-contestant game, we are typically looking for a Nash equilibrium (saddle point strategy pair). In general, not only the contestant's optimal response but also the optimal quizmaster strategy will depend on the loss function. This dependence renders probability updating an application-dependent endeavour. Our main result in this section is that for an important class of games (and only these) the optimal quizmaster strategy is independent of the loss function. For these cases we derive a probability update rule that is application independent, like standard probability conditioning, but that applies much more broadly. The following is the summary result of this section (the precise statements can be found in Theorems 18, 19 and 20).

Theorem 15. *Fix an irreducible game with set of messages \mathcal{Y} . Then*

\mathcal{Y} is a graph or a matroid	iff	for any marginal on outcomes, the worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster is identical for all regular loss functions
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We first show a simple method of simplifying message structures in Section 5.1; there we will also see that if \mathcal{Y} is a partition of \mathcal{X} , naive conditioning is worst-case optimal.

In Section 5.2, we consider symmetry properties that worst-case optimal strategies must have, provided that the loss function also obeys a form of symmetry. Then in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we show two classes of message structures for which the worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster can be characterized by the RCAR condition (10). This is the condition that also characterizes worst-case optimal strategies for local loss functions and for Kelly gambling with arbitrary payoffs (by Theorem 10 and Lemma 14); the results in this section show that the same characterization sometimes holds for a much more general class of loss functions. This leads to an interesting property of those (and only those) message structures, discussed in Section 5.5: the same strategy P^* will be optimal for the quizmaster regardless of the loss function.

We will look at the game from the perspective of the quizmaster, and consider worst-case optimal strategies P^* for him. In games for which a Nash equilibrium exists, the contestant's worst-case optimal strategies can be found easily once we know P^* and a KT-vector certifying its optimality as in Theorem 3: given a KT-vector, Q^* can be constructed message-by-message to satisfy the condition in Theorem 7. This is even easier in the case of proper loss functions, where for each y with $P^*(y) > 0$, an optimal response is simply $Q_y^* = P^*(\cdot | y)$. Another advantage of looking at the game from the quizmaster's side is that our Theorem 3 characterizing worst-case optimal P^* requires weaker conditions than Theorem 7 characterizing worst-case optimal Q^* .

5.1. Decomposition of games

For some message structures, regardless of the marginal and loss function, the problem of finding a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster can be solved by considering a smaller message structure instead. It will be useful to look at such simplifications first, so that in the coming sections we will only need to deal with message structures that have already been simplified.

We have already seen one example of the type of result we are looking for earlier, in Lemma 2 on page 13, where we saw that if a message is *dominated* by another (meaning that it is a subset of the other), then the quizmaster always has a worst-case optimal strategy that assigns probability 0 to the dominated message. In this subsection, we introduce a second simplification, by means of decomposition into connected components.

Connectivity is a fundamental concept from graph theory. However, in general, our message structures are not graphs, but *hypergraphs*. Like an ordinary graph, a hypergraph is defined by a set of nodes and a set of edges, but the edges are allowed to be arbitrary subsets of the nodes; in a graph, all edges must contain exactly two nodes. Thus for a probability updating game, we can talk about the hypergraph $(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})$, having the outcomes as its nodes and the messages as its edges.

The terminology of connectivity can be generalized from graphs to hypergraphs [15]. We will say that a game is connected if its underlying hypergraph is connected. This leads to the following definitions.

If for some game $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, p, L)$, there is a set $\emptyset \subsetneq S \subsetneq \mathcal{X}$ such that for each message y , either $y \subseteq S$ or $y \subseteq \mathcal{X} \setminus S$, then the game can be *decomposed* into two games $\mathcal{G}_1 = (\mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{Y}_1, p^{(1)}, L)$ and $\mathcal{G}_2 = (\mathcal{X}_2, \mathcal{Y}_2, p^{(2)}, L)$ with $\mathcal{X}_1 = S$, $\mathcal{X}_2 = \mathcal{X} \setminus S$, $\mathcal{Y}_i = \{y \in \mathcal{Y} \mid y \subseteq \mathcal{X}_i\}$, and $p^{(i)}(x) = p(x) / \sum_{x' \in \mathcal{X}_i} p(x')$. If no such set S exists, we say the game \mathcal{G} is *connected*.

Lemma 16 (Decomposition). *If a game \mathcal{G} can be decomposed into \mathcal{G}_1 and \mathcal{G}_2 as described above, and its loss function L is such that H_L is finite and continuous and $H_L(P) = \inf_{Q \in \Delta_y} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{Y}} P(x)L(x, Q)$ for each $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ and each $P \in \Delta_y$, then a strategy P^* is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster in \mathcal{G} if and only if there exist worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster P_1^* and P_2^* in \mathcal{G}_1 and \mathcal{G}_2 respectively such that*

$$P^*(x, y) = \begin{cases} P_1^*(x, y) \cdot \sum_{x' \in \mathcal{X}_1} p(x') & \text{for } x \in \mathcal{X}_1; \\ P_2^*(x, y) \cdot \sum_{x' \in \mathcal{X}_2} p(x') & \text{for } x \in \mathcal{X}_2. \end{cases}$$

(The extra condition on L is necessary to exclude some ‘very improper’ loss functions: those that reward the contestant for predicting outcomes known to have probability 0.) In particular, if the messages of \mathcal{G} form a partition of \mathcal{X} , then \mathcal{G} can be decomposed into games that each contain only one message. In a game \mathcal{G} of this form, the quizmaster has only one strategy to choose from. If the loss function is proper, naive conditioning is an optimal response to this strategy, and thus worst-case optimal.

Together with Lemma 2, this lemma allows us to reduce any game in which we want to find a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster to a set of connected games containing no dominated messages. These reduced games will not contain any messages of size one, unless one of the games consists of only that message: a message of size one is either dominated, or it forms a trivial component containing no other messages.

5.2. Outcome symmetry

Sometimes, the problem of finding a worst-case optimal strategy is simplified because certain ‘symmetry’ properties of the message structure and loss function allow us to conclude that worst-case optimal strategies satisfying an additional condition must have the same symmetries.

5.2.1. Symmetry of loss functions

We now briefly return to the topic of loss functions to define a property we will need next. For a probability distribution $Q \in \Delta_X$ and x_1, x_2 distinct elements of \mathcal{X} , define $Q^{x_1 \leftrightarrow x_2}$ as

$$Q^{x_1 \leftrightarrow x_2}(x) = \begin{cases} Q(x_2) & \text{for } x = x_1; \\ Q(x_1) & \text{for } x = x_2; \\ Q(x) & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

and similarly for a contestant’s strategy $Q \in \mathcal{Q}$ by applying this transformation to the conditional for each y . We say L is *symmetric between x_1 and x_2* if for all $Q \in \Delta_X$, we have $L(x_1, Q) = L(x_2, Q^{x_1 \leftrightarrow x_2})$ and $L(x, Q) = L(x, Q^{x_1 \leftrightarrow x_2})$ for all $x \in \mathcal{X} \setminus \{x_1, x_2\}$. If L is symmetric between x_1 and x_2 and between x_2 and x_3 , then it is also symmetric between x_1 and x_3 , because $((Q^{x_1 \leftrightarrow x_2})^{x_2 \leftrightarrow x_3})^{x_1 \leftrightarrow x_2} = Q^{x_1 \leftrightarrow x_3}$. In words: we can apply the first symmetry, then the second, then the first again to find that we have exchanged x_1 and x_3 . We also consider any loss function to be symmetric between x and x for any x . So this symmetry of L is an equivalence relation on \mathcal{X} , and we are justified in talking about L being symmetric on sets $S \subseteq \mathcal{X}$, meaning that all pairs of elements of that set can be exchanged. If L is symmetric on \mathcal{X} , we say it is *fully symmetric*.

The loss functions we have seen so far were fully symmetric. The affine transformations of loss functions discussed at the end of Section 4.2 may change the symmetries of a loss function, while they do not change which strategies are worst-case optimal for the two players. This means that sometimes, an asymmetric loss function can be transformed into an essentially equivalent loss function with better symmetry properties. Yet not all loss functions can be transformed this way. The following two examples are about loss functions exhibiting this kind of *inherent* asymmetry.

Example I (Matrix loss). Given a $[0, \infty)$ -valued $X \times X$ matrix of losses A , define *hard matrix loss* by

$$L(x, Q) = \begin{cases} A_{x,x'} & \text{if } Q(x') = 1 \text{ for some } x'; \\ \infty & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

This generalizes hard 0-1 loss, which is obtained for the matrix A with zeroes on the diagonal and ones elsewhere (except that the definition above may give infinite loss for some Q , but a rational contestant would never use such Q). It is symmetric between x_1 and x_2 if and only if swapping row x_1 with x_2 and column x_1 with x_2 results in matrix A again; that is, if and only if $A_{x_1,x_1} = A_{x_2,x_2}$, $A_{x_1,x_2} = A_{x_2,x_1}$, $A_{x',x_1} = A_{x',x_2}$, and $A_{x_1,x'} = A_{x_2,x'}$, for all $x' \in X \setminus \{x_1, x_2\}$.

We can also define randomized matrix loss as an analogous generalization of randomized 0-1 loss, by taking an expectation over Q in hard matrix loss:

$$L(x, Q) = \sum_{x' \in X} Q(x') A_{x,x'}.$$

It has the same symmetry properties as hard matrix loss. The proof of Proposition 6 also applies to randomized matrix loss without modification, showing that a Nash equilibrium exists in games using this loss function.

Example J (Skewed logarithmic loss). Fix a vector $c \in \mathbf{R}_{\geq 0}^X$, and define the function $F : \Delta_X \rightarrow \mathbf{R}_{\geq 0}$ by

$$F(P) := - \sum_{x \in X} c_x P(x) \log P(x).$$

This is a sum of differentiable concave functions, and therefore differentiable and concave; if $c \in \mathbf{R}_{>0}^X$, it is strictly concave (in fact, it is also strictly concave if c contains a single 0). We use the construction of *Bregman scores* in Grünwald and Dawid [14, Section 3.5.4] to construct a proper loss function L having F as its generalized entropy, and find

$$L(x, Q) = F(Q) + (e_x - Q) \cdot \nabla F(Q) = -c_x(1 + \log Q(x)) + \sum_{x' \in X} c_{x'} Q(x'),$$

where e_x is the distribution that puts all mass on x . This loss function is strictly proper if H_L is strictly concave. Unlike logarithmic loss and its affine transformations, it is not local for $|X| > 2$. Also, it is not generally fully symmetric, but is symmetric between pairs of outcomes $x_1, x_2 \in X$ with $c_{x_1} = c_{x_2}$.

5.2.2. Symmetry of KT-vectors

Using the definition of symmetry of loss functions introduced in the previous section, we can now state the following lemma.

Lemma 17 (Loss exchange). *Consider a game with $y_1, y_2 \in \mathcal{Y}$, $y_1 \setminus y_2 = \{x_1\}$, $y_2 \setminus y_1 = \{x_2\}$, H_L finite and continuous and L symmetric between x_1 and x_2 . If a worst-case optimal strategy P^* for the quizmaster exists with $P^*(x_1, y_1) > 0$, then all KT-vectors λ^* satisfy $\lambda_{x_1}^* \leq \lambda_{x_2}^*$ (so if in addition $P^*(x_2, y_2) > 0$ then $\lambda_{x_1}^* = \lambda_{x_2}^*$).*

When two messages $y_1, y_2 \in \mathcal{Y}$ satisfy $y_1 \setminus y_2 = \{x_1\}$ and $y_2 \setminus y_1 = \{x_2\}$, we say that they differ by the *exchange* of one outcome.

It will be useful to have a term for the symmetry conditions on L that allow us to apply Lemma 17 to any pair of messages in some set $\mathcal{Y}' \subseteq \mathcal{Y}$ satisfying the statement of the lemma. We say L is *symmetric with respect to exchanges in \mathcal{Y}'* if L is symmetric between any pair of outcomes x_1, x_2 such that messages $y_1, y_2 \in \mathcal{Y}'$ exist with $y_1 \setminus y_2 = \{x_1\}$ and $y_2 \setminus y_1 = \{x_2\}$.

We saw in Theorem 10 that for logarithmic loss, worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster can be characterized in terms of a simple condition, the *RCAR condition* (10). We also saw that sometimes (in Examples B and C on pages 15 and 17, but not in Example D), those same strategies were also worst-case optimal for other loss functions. This suggests that even for some types of games where Theorem 10 does not apply, it is possible to recognize worst-case optimal strategies using the easily verifiable RCAR condition. We show that there are two classes of message structures in which this is possible regardless of the marginal, and explore the consequences in Section 5.5.

5.3. Graph games

The first of these classes consist of all message structures \mathcal{Y} for which each message contains at most two outcomes. After removing singleton messages (which are either dominated or are decomposable from the rest of the game), we have $|y| = 2$ for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. This corresponds to a simple undirected graph (that is, a graph containing no loops or multiple edges) with a node for each outcome in X and an edge for each message in \mathcal{Y} . For this reason, a game where each message in \mathcal{Y} contains at most two outcomes is called a *graph game*. Many games we saw in previous examples were graph games. Their underlying graphs are shown in Figure 4.

Theorem 18 (RCAR for graph games). *If each message in \mathcal{Y} contains at most two outcomes and $P^* \in \mathcal{P}$ is an RCAR strategy, then P^* is worst-case optimal for all L symmetric with respect to exchanges in $\{y \in \mathcal{Y} \mid |y| = 2\}$ with H_L finite and continuous. If additionally H_L is strictly concave, only such P^* are worst-case optimal for L .*

The statement of the theorem is very similar to that of Theorem 10 in Section 4.2, and the restrictions on L in the present theorem (except for symmetry) were also seen in the previous theorem. Sufficient conditions for these restrictions to hold were given by Lemma 1 in Section 3.1 (H_L finite and continuous) and Lemma 13 in Section 4.2 (strict concavity of H_L).




Figure 4: Underlying graphs of the graph games seen in the examples

The intuition behind the proof is that for binary predictions Q , the probability assigned by Q to one outcome determines the probability Q assigns to the other outcome. Thus all loss functions are essentially local when used to assess such predictions, and their behaviour is similar to logarithmic loss.

5.4. Matroid games

The other class is that of *matroid games*. A *matroid* over a finite *ground set* X can be defined by a nonempty family \mathcal{Y} of subsets of X (the *bases* of the matroid) satisfying the *basis exchange* property [24, Corollary 1.2.5]: for all $y_1, y_2 \in \mathcal{Y}$ and $x_1 \in y_1 \setminus y_2$,

$$(y_1 \setminus \{x_1\}) \cup \{x_2\} \in \mathcal{Y} \text{ for some } x_2 \in y_2 \setminus y_1. \quad (13)$$

In words, for any pair of messages, if an outcome that is not in the second message is removed from the first message, it must be possible to replace it by an outcome from the second message that is not in the first message, in such a way that the resulting set of outcomes is again a message.

A matroid game is a game in which \mathcal{Y} is the set of bases of a matroid. The Monty Hall game (Example B) is a matroid game: taking one of the two messages and replacing the outcome unique to it by the only other outcome will result in the other message. By our definition of a game, it is required in addition to (13) that each element of the ground set X of the matroid occurs in some basis.

Many alternative characterizations of matroids exist. For example, a matroid with ground set X and bases \mathcal{Y} can also be represented by its family of *independent sets* $\mathcal{I} = \{I \subseteq X \mid I \subseteq y \text{ for some } y \in \mathcal{Y}\}$, and a different set of axioms analogous to (13) characterizes whether a given set \mathcal{I} is the family of independent sets of some matroid.

The concept of a matroid was introduced by Whitney [25] to study the abstract properties of the notion of dependence, as seen for example in linear algebra and graph theory (explained below). Different characterizations of the concept, applied to different examples, were given independently by other authors, but then turned out to be

equivalent to matroids. One field where matroids play an important role is combinatorial optimization. We refer to Schrijver [21, Section 39.10b] for extensive historical notes.

We give two example classes of matroids, taken from Schrijver [21, Section 39.4]:

- Given an $m \times n$ matrix A over some vector space, let $X = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ and \mathcal{I} the family of all subsets I of X such that the set of column vectors with index in I is linearly independent. Then \mathcal{I} is the family of independent sets of a matroid. A subset that spans the column space of A is a basis of this matroid.
- Given a simple undirected graph G , let X be its set of edges and \mathcal{I} consist of all acyclic subsets of X . Then \mathcal{I} is the family of independent sets of a matroid. This matroid is called the *cycle matroid* of G . The bases are the maximal independent sets; if G is connected, these are its spanning trees.

One interesting class of games for which \mathcal{Y} are the bases of a matroid is the class of *negation games*. In such a game, each element of \mathcal{Y} is of the form $X \setminus \{x\}$ for some x . (Not all sets of this form need to be in \mathcal{Y} .) Thus the quizmaster will tell the contestant, “The true outcome is *not* x ,” as in the original Monty Hall problem where one of the three doors is opened to reveal a goat. A family \mathcal{Y} of this form satisfies (13) trivially: for y_1, y_2 distinct elements of \mathcal{Y} , there is only one choice for each of x_1 and x_2 , and with these choices we get $(y_1 \setminus \{x_1\}) \cup \{x_2\} = y_2 \in \mathcal{Y}$.

Another class of matroids is formed by the *uniform matroids*, in which *every* set of some fixed size k is a basis. These also have a natural interpretation when they occur as the message structure of a game: the quizmaster is allowed to leave any set of k doors shut.

As the following theorem shows, matroid games share with graph games the property that RCAR strategies are worst-case optimal for a wide variety of loss functions.

Theorem 19 (RCAR for matroid games). *If \mathcal{Y} are the bases of a matroid and $P^* \in \mathcal{P}$ is an RCAR strategy, then P^* is worst-case optimal for all L symmetric with respect to exchanges in \mathcal{Y} with H_L finite and continuous. If additionally H_L is strictly concave, only such P^* are worst-case optimal for L .*

5.5. Loss invariance

We saw in the preceding sections that in graph and matroid games, worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster are characterized by the RCAR property. This property does not depend on what loss function is used in the game (though the theorems do put some conditions on the loss function, such as some symmetry requirements). Consequently, in such games, strategies exist that are worst-case optimal regardless of what loss function is used (at least, for a large class of loss functions). We call this phenomenon *loss invariance*.

For such message structures, we can really think of the worst-case optimal strategies as ‘conditioning’ (as a purely probability-based operation) rather than as worst-case optimal strategies for some game. This conditioning operation can be seen as the generalization of naive conditioning to message structures other than partitions (where naive conditioning gives the right answer). Unlike naive conditioning, which requires

just the distribution p and the message y to compute $P(x | y)$, we also need the message structure \mathcal{Y} to compute that conditional probability. But like naive conditioning, we do not need to fix a loss function in order to talk about the worst-case optimal prediction of x given a message y .

A subtlety appears when improper loss functions are considered. Our theorems show that the worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster are characterized independently of the loss function; however, the worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant will not necessarily coincide with these if the loss function is not proper. In this case, loss invariance tells us that the loss function does not affect *what the contestant should believe* about the true outcome, but it may affect how the contestant translates this belief into a prediction.

In the cases of graph and matroid games, our analysis of worst-case optimal strategies becomes more widely applicable in situations where the probability updating game is really played by two players (as opposed to being a theoretical tool for defining safe updating strategies):

- the same strategies continue to be worst-case optimal if the two players use different loss functions (so that the game is no longer zero-sum);
- both players will be able to play optimally without knowing the loss function(s) in use.

This is true for the Monty Hall game (Example B), which lies in the intersection of graph and matroid games. This provides some justification for the prevailing intuition that the Monty Hall problem should be analysed using probability theory, without mention of loss functions.

Theorems 18 and 19 apply only to loss functions that are sufficiently symmetric and for which H_L is continuous and finite. We make no claim about the question whether RCAR strategies are also worst-case optimal for loss functions that do not satisfy these properties. However, note that by Lemma 14, sometimes affine transformations can be used to convert an asymmetric loss function into a symmetric one without affecting the players' strategies.

Lemma 14 also shows that a limited form of loss invariance holds regardless of the message structure. If the players are using different affine transformations of the same loss function (for example, of logarithmic loss; this corresponds to Kelly gambling where the pay-offs for the contestant are different from those for the quizmaster), both players can play optimally without knowing the transformations in use.

An obvious question that remains is: are there any other classes of message structure for which we have loss invariance? This is answered in the negative by the following theorem.

Theorem 20. *If a connected game containing no dominated messages is neither a matroid game nor a graph game, then there exists a marginal such that no strategy P for the quizmaster is worst-case optimal for both logarithmic loss and Brier loss.*

6. Conclusion

Conditioning is the method of choice for updating probabilities to incorporate new information. We started by reviewing why naive conditioning gives incorrect answers when the set of messages is not a partition of the set of outcomes. For in this case the association of messages to outcomes (the coarsening mechanism, or quizmaster strategy) needs to be taken into account. In general however, this mechanism is unknown. Previous work showed that conditioning is correct if the mechanism satisfies (variants of) the CAR (coarsening at random) condition. In this article we take a different route and investigate minimax probability updating strategies that are robust to the worst-case coarsening mechanism. To this end we modelled probability updating as a two-player zero sum game between a quizmaster and a contestant. In Section 3 we discussed the optimal strategies for both players, characterizing both the hardest coarsening mechanism (quizmaster strategy) and the worst-case optimal way to incorporate new information (contestant strategy). In Section 4 we specialized the results to different classes of loss functions. A summary of these theorems was given in Table 1 on page 13. Then in Section 5 we investigated graph and matroid games, and show that for these games the worst-case optimal strategy does not depend on which loss function is used by both players, so that the updated probabilities are independent of the intended application.

6.1. Future work

There are many scenarios in which our results currently do not apply, but to which they might be extended. For example, the quizmaster’s hard constraint $y \ni x$ could be replaced by some soft constraint, so that each message y still carries information about the true outcome, but no longer in the form of a subset of \mathcal{X} . One way to achieve this might be by affine transformations of the loss function as discussed at the end of Section 4.2, but allowing the constants to depend on both x and y . This could give a worst-case analogue to *Jeffrey conditioning* or *minimum relative entropy updating* [4].

Possible extensions would be to infinite outcome and message spaces. We are also interested in probability updating in sequential (online) interaction protocols [26].

Other questions concern the comparison between different alternative approaches the contestant might use to update his probabilities. For example, can we bound the difference in expected loss between worst-case optimal and naive conditioning? What about ignoring the message and always predicting with the marginal, or ignoring the constraints imposed on the quizmaster by the marginal and predicting with the maximum entropy distribution on y ? (Both these strategies are overly pessimistic.) Conversely, we might wonder how much the contestant loses by playing a worst-case optimal strategy when the quizmaster is not adversarial, but for instance chooses from the available messages uniformly at random. In this context it is also of interest how to resolve the problem of non-unique worst-case optimal strategies in a principled way.

Acknowledgments. Van Ommen and Grünwald gratefully acknowledge support from NWO Vici grant 639.073.04. We would like to thank Teddy Seidenfeld and Erik Quaeghebeur for insightful discussions. Koolen was supported by a Queensland University of Technology Vice-Chancellor’s Research Fellowship and by NWO Veni grant 639.021.439.

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Appendix A. Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. For finite H_L , concavity of H_L is shown by Grünwald and Dawid [14, Proposition 3.2], and lower semi-continuity by Rockafellar [17, Theorem 10.2] (using that the domain of H_L is a simplex). If L is finite, then picking any $Q \in \Delta_X$ gives an upper bound to H_L , so that H_L is in particular finite. Concavity now follows by the first claim, and continuity by Grünwald and Dawid [14, Corollary 3.3; an important condition is in Corollary 3.2]. \square

Proof of Lemma 2. If $P(y_2) = 0$ then $P' = P$ and the result is trivial; if $P(y_2) > 0$ but $P(y_1) = 0$, then $P(\cdot | y_2) = P'(\cdot | y_1)$ so P and P' have the same expected generalized entropy. Otherwise $P(\cdot | y_1)$ and $P(\cdot | y_2)$ are well-defined, and $P'(\cdot | y_1) = (P(y_1)P(\cdot | y_1) + P(y_2)P(\cdot | y_2))/(P(y_1) + P(y_2))$ is a convex combination of them. By concavity of H_L , $\sum_y P'(y)H_L(P'(\cdot | y)) \geq \sum_y P(y)H_L(P(\cdot | y))$. \square

Proof of Theorem 3. Rockafellar [17, Theorem 27.3] gives conditions under which a convex minimization problem has a solution attaining the minimum. These are satisfied by \mathcal{P} and $-H_L$: \mathcal{P} is nonempty, closed, convex, and bounded (thus has no direction of recession), and $-H_L$ is convex (Lemma 1), finite for all $P \in \mathcal{P}$ (thus proper), and lower semi-continuous (thus closed).

By Rockafellar [17, Corollary 28.2.2], a KT-vector λ^* exists, so that for the remaining claims of the theorem, it suffices to show that P^* is worst-case optimal and λ^* is a KT-vector if and only if the given conditions on (P^*, λ^*) hold. To prove this, we rewrite the maximin problem to a convex optimization problem where P may range

over $P \in \mathbf{R}_{\geq 0}^{\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})}$, a strict superset of \mathcal{P} . In this larger set, $P(x | y) := P(x, y)/P(y)$ still defines a conditional probability distribution for y with $P(y) > 0$, because any scale factor cancels out.

The following function extends the quizmaster's objective function (5) (the expected generalized entropy of $P \in \mathcal{P}$) to the domain $\mathbf{R}_{\geq 0}^{\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})}$:

$$\begin{aligned} f_0(P) &:= \inf_{Q \in \mathcal{Q}} \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}, x \in \mathcal{X}} P(x, y) L(x, Q|_y) \\ &= \sum_{\substack{y \in \mathcal{Y}: \\ P(y) > 0}} \inf_{\substack{Q|_y \in \Delta_{\mathcal{X}} \\ P(y) > 0}} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} P(x, y) L(x, Q|_y) = \sum_{\substack{y \in \mathcal{Y}: \\ P(y) > 0}} P(y) H_L(P(\cdot | y)). \end{aligned}$$

Using this concave function (infimum of linear functions), the convex optimization problem is given by

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{maximize} && f_0(P) \\ &\text{subject to} && \sum_{y \ni x} P(x, y) = p_x \quad \text{for all } x \in \mathcal{X}, \end{aligned}$$

with $P \in \mathbf{R}_{\geq 0}^{\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})}$. By Rockafellar [17, Theorem 28.3], $P^* \in \mathbf{R}_{\geq 0}^{\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})}$ maximizes this and $\lambda^* \in \mathbf{R}^{\mathcal{X}}$ is a KT-vector if and only if $P^* \in \mathcal{P}$ and at P^* , the zero vector is a supergradient to

$$f_0(P^*) - \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \lambda_x^* \left(\sum_{y \ni x} P^*(x, y) - p_x \right). \quad (\text{A.1})$$

The term being subtracted is linear, with gradient $\bar{\lambda} \in \mathbf{R}^{\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})}$ given by

$$\bar{\lambda}_{x,y} := \frac{\partial}{\partial P^*(x, y)} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \lambda_x^* \left(\sum_{y \ni x} P^*(x, y) - p_x \right) = \lambda_x^*. \quad (\text{A.2})$$

By Rockafellar [17, Theorem 23.8], 0 is a supergradient to (A.1) if and only if $\bar{\lambda}$ is a supergradient to f_0 at P^* .

For any P^* that is not everywhere zero, we have for all $c \geq 0$ that $f_0(cP^*) = cf_0(P^*)$, so that a supporting hyperplane to f_0 at any $P^* \in \mathcal{P}$ must go through the origin. Then the supporting hyperplane with gradient $\bar{\lambda}$ has as defining equation the linear expression $\sum_{x,y} P(x, y) \bar{\lambda}_{x,y}$.

If $\sum_{x,y} P(x, y) \bar{\lambda}_{x,y}$ defines a supporting hyperplane to f_0 at P^* , then

1. at every $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ with $P^*(y) > 0$, it is a supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at $P^*(\cdot | y)$, and
2. for every y with $P^*(y) = 0$, $H_L(P') \leq \sum_x P'(x) \bar{\lambda}_{x,y}$ for all $P' \in \Delta_y$.

The converse also holds: we have for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ and $P' \in \Delta_y$ that $H_L(P') \leq \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} P' \bar{\lambda}_{x,y}$, with equality if $P^*(y) > 0$ and $P' = P^*(\cdot | y)$; taking the convex combination with coefficients $P^*(y)$ shows that the hyperplane defined by $\sum_{x,y} P(x, y) \bar{\lambda}_{x,y}$ is nowhere below f_0 and touches it at $P = P^*$.

For $\bar{\lambda}$ of the required form (A.2), this is in turn equivalent to the characterization given in the statement of the theorem. \square

Proof of Lemma 4. The function $\sum_{x \in y} \lambda_x P(x) - H_L(P)$ attains its minimum d on Δ_y at some P [17, Theorem 27.3]. Let $\lambda' \in \Lambda_y$ be given by $\lambda'_x = \lambda_x - d$ for all $x \in y$: this defines a hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ that is supporting at the minimizing P , proving the first part of the lemma.

For the third part, let λ , λ' and P be as described. $\lambda' \leq \lambda$ implies $P^\top \lambda' \leq P^\top \lambda$. Neither can be smaller than $H_L(P)$, and since the right hand side must equal $H_L(P)$ because λ is supporting at P , so must the left hand side, showing that λ' is also supporting at P . If $P(x) = 1$ for some $x \in y$, then $P^\top \lambda'' = \lambda''_x$ for any λ'' , so in particular $\lambda'_x = \lambda_x = H_L(P)$. For other $P \in \Delta_y$, we use that two linear functions obeying an inequality on their domain $D := \Delta_{\{x \in y \mid P(x) > 0\}}$ and coinciding at a point in the relative interior of D must coincide everywhere on D , so that again $\lambda'_x = \lambda_x$ for $x \in y$ with $P(x) > 0$.

It remains to show that given such a λ , a minimal $\lambda' \leq \lambda$ exists in Λ_y . Consider the set $\Lambda' := \{\lambda' \in \Lambda_y \mid \lambda' \leq \lambda\}$. The set of supporting hyperplanes to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at P in Λ_y is closed [17, Section 23, definition subdifferential (page 215)]; Λ' is a subset of this set (as we just saw), obtained by adding further non-strict linear constraints, so it too is closed. It also has the property that if $\lambda' \in \Lambda'$ is minimal in that set, it is also minimal in Λ_y . Now fix any P' in the relative interior of Δ_y , and pick some $\lambda' \in \Lambda'$ that minimizes $P'^\top \lambda'$ (this minimum must be attained because the expression is bounded below and Λ' is closed). Such a λ' is also minimal in the partial order, so it is the element we are looking for. \square

Proof of Theorem 5. Take a worst-case optimal strategy P^* for the quizmaster and KT-vector λ^* . For each $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, define a vector

$$\lambda'_x = \begin{cases} \lambda_x^* & \text{for } x \in y \\ 0 & \text{for } x \notin y. \end{cases}$$

By the statement of Theorem 3, $\lambda' \in \Lambda_y$. Let λ be a minimal element of Λ_y with $\lambda \leq \lambda'$: such an element exists by parts 1 and 2 of Lemma 4. (If λ' is itself minimal, $\lambda = \lambda'$). By assumption, λ is realizable on y . Let Q_y^* be given by this Q .

By playing this Q^* , the contestant will achieve expected loss (against any strategy $P \in \mathcal{P}$ for the quizmaster, for λ^* any KT-vector)

$$\sum_{x,y} P(x,y) L(x, Q_y^*) \leq \sum_{x,y} P(x,y) \lambda_x^* = \sum_x p_x \lambda_x^*.$$

The right-hand side is the maximum loss the quizmaster can achieve in the maximin game. By (7), the reverse inequality also holds, so we find that the values of the minimax and maximin games must be equal. \square

Proof of Proposition 6. We first introduce some additional terminology in order to apply a corollary from Rockafellar [17].

A nonvertical hyperplane defined by $\lambda \in \mathbf{R}^X$ is geometrically a subset of $\mathbf{R}^X \times \mathbf{R}$, namely $\{(P', z') \in \mathbf{R}^X \times \mathbf{R} \mid z' = P'^\top \lambda\}$. This set is the boundary of the half-space $H_\lambda = \{(P', z') \in \mathbf{R}^X \times \mathbf{R} \mid z' \leq P'^\top \lambda\}$. A hyperplane λ is supporting to a concave

function $f : \mathbf{R}^X \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$ at the point $P \in \mathbf{R}^X$ with $f(P) = P^\top \lambda$ if and only if the hypograph of f is a subset of H_λ .

A column vector $(-\alpha\lambda, \alpha)$ is called *normal* to a convex set C at a point $(P, z) \in C$ if $(P' - P, z' - z)^\top (-\alpha\lambda, \alpha) \leq 0$ for all $(P', z') \in C$ [17]; that is, if $C \subseteq \{(P', z') \mid (P' - P, z' - z)^\top (-\alpha\lambda, \alpha) \leq 0\}$. This latter set is equal to H_λ if $\alpha > 0$ and $z = P^\top \lambda$. So if C is the hypograph of f and $f(P) = z = P^\top \lambda$, then λ is a supporting hyperplane to f at P if and only if $(-\lambda, 1)$ is normal to C .

The set of all vectors normal to C at (P, z) is called the *normal cone* at (P, z) . The normal cone to H_λ at given $(P, P^\top \lambda)$ is the half-line $\{(-\alpha\lambda, \alpha) \mid \alpha \in [0, \infty)\}$.

For L randomized 0-1 loss, let the function $f_0 : \mathbf{R}^X \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$ be given by $f_0(P) = \min_{Q \in \Delta_X} \sum_{x' \in X} P(x') L(x', Q)$; note that $f_0 \upharpoonright \Delta_X = H_L$, and that for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, any minimal supporting hyperplane $\lambda \in \Lambda_y$ to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ can be extended to a supporting hyperplane λ' to f_0 with $\lambda'_x = \lambda_x$ for all $x \in y$.

The hypograph of f_0 is $C = \bigcap_{x \in X} H_{\lambda^{(x)}}$, with $\lambda^{(x)} = L(x', e_x)$ (where e_x is the distribution that puts all mass on x). By Rockafellar [17, Corollary 23.8.1], for C of this form and (P, z) a point on the boundary of C , the normal cone of C at (P, z) is the sum of the individual normal cones. The normal cone of any set at a point in the interior of that set is just $\{0\}$, so we can ignore those halfspaces when determining the normal cone. Then the corollary says that any vector $(-\lambda, 1)$ normal to f_0 at $(P, f_0(P))$ can be written as $\sum_{x \in X: P^\top \lambda^{(x)} = f_0(P)} (-\alpha_x \lambda^{(x)}, \alpha_x)$: λ is a convex combination of those $\lambda^{(x)}$.

Conclusion: any minimal supporting hyperplane λ to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at $P \in \Delta_y$ with randomized 0-1 loss is a convex combination of the hyperplanes realized by hard 0-1 loss that are supporting at P . Therefore, randomizing allows the contestant to realize λ . \square

Proof of Theorem 7. From Theorem 5, we know that a strategy exists for the contestant that achieves loss $\sum_x p_x \lambda_x^*$ where λ^* is any KT-vector, and that this is worst-case optimal. Hence Q^* is worst-case optimal if and only if it achieves the same worst-case expected loss. The worst-case expected loss of a strategy $Q \in \mathcal{Q}$ is

$$\max_{P \in \mathcal{P}} \sum_{x, y} P(x, y) L(x, Q|_y) = \sum_x p_x \max_{y \ni x} L(x, Q|_y).$$

Therefore if for all x, y with $x \in y$, we have $L(x, Q|_y) \leq \lambda_x^*$ for some KT-vector λ^* , Q is worst-case optimal.

For the converse, pick any $Q \in \mathcal{Q}$ and suppose that the vector given by $\lambda_x := \max_y L(x, Q|_y)$ is not a KT-vector. Then by Theorem 3, there is no $P \in \mathcal{P}$ such that P and λ satisfy the conditions of that theorem. Equivalently, for all $P \in \mathcal{P}$, there either is a message y such that the hyperplane defined by λ passes below H_L somewhere in Δ_y , or there is a message y with $P(y) > 0$ but the hyperplane lies strictly above H_L at $P(\cdot \mid y)$. The former contradicts the definition of H_L , so for λ not a KT-vector, the latter must be the case. But then against any $P \in \mathcal{P}$ (in particular against worst-case optimal P), there is a different strategy $Q' \in \mathcal{Q}$ that is equal to Q except for its response to the message y : $Q'|_y$ realizes a supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at $P(\cdot \mid y)$. This strategy Q' obtains strictly smaller expected loss than Q , so Q is not worst-case optimal. (In other words: in a Nash equilibrium (P^*, Q^*) , the contestant can only do worse against P^* by changing strategy, but here he can do better.) \square

Proof of Lemma 8. For proper loss functions, L and H_L are related as follows: at all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ and $P \in \Delta_y$, if the vector $\lambda = L(\cdot, P)$ is finite at all $x \in y$, it describes the nonvertical hyperplane realized by P , which is a supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at P .

Now suppose that at some $P \in \Delta_y$, there exists a minimal supporting hyperplane $\lambda' \in \Lambda_y$ other than $\lambda := L(\cdot \mid P)$, the supporting hyperplane realized by P (here we allow vertical hyperplanes, for which λ may include infinities). Let $x \in y$ be an outcome where $\lambda'_x < \lambda_x$, which exists by minimality of λ' . Write e_x for the probability distribution that puts all mass on this outcome, and define $P_\alpha := (1 - \alpha)P + \alpha e_x$ for $\alpha \in (0, 1]$. For each of these points P_α , the hyperplane $L(\cdot, P_\alpha)$ realized by P_α is at most as high as λ' at P_α (because $L(\cdot, P_\alpha)$ is supporting there) and at least as high as λ' at P (where λ' is supporting), so $L(x, P_\alpha)$ is bounded away from λ_x by λ'_x : $L(x, P_\alpha) \leq \lambda'_x < \lambda_x$. Therefore $\lim_{\alpha \downarrow 0} L(x, P_\alpha) \neq L(x, P)$, and L is not continuous. For L proper and continuous, this proves the ‘at most one’ part of the lemma.

For the ‘exactly one’ part: by Rockafellar [17, Theorem 23.3], a nonvertical supporting hyperplane may only fail to exist at P if there is a line segment through P falling inside Δ_y on one side of P and outside on the other; that is, for P on the relative boundary of Δ_y .

Finally, suppose that $\lambda = L(\cdot, P)$ (the hyperplane realized by P) is finite at all $x \in y$ but not minimal. Then by Lemma 4, a different minimal supporting hyperplane λ' exists at P , which by the above gives a contradiction. This shows that if λ is finite, it is the minimal supporting hyperplane. \square

Proof of Theorem 9. Theorem 3 applies, showing existence of a KT-vector and a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster.

A worst-case optimal Q^* exists and forms a Nash equilibrium with P^* : For each $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ and each $P \in \Delta_y$, by Lemma 8 there is at most one minimal supporting hyperplane at P which is then realized by $Q = P$. So all minimal supporting hyperplanes are realizable on y , and Theorem 5 applies.

Next we show that the characterization of P^* and λ^* in Theorem 3 is equivalent to the one in this theorem. We consider y with $P^*(y) > 0$ first. If P^* is a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster λ^* defines a supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at $P^*(\cdot \mid y)$, then by Lemma 4 there exists a minimal $\lambda' \in \Lambda_y$ which is also supporting at $P^*(\cdot \mid y)$ and which satisfies $\lambda'_x \leq \lambda_x$ for $x \in y$, with equality for $P^*(x \mid y) > 0$. By Lemma 8, $\lambda'_x = L(\cdot, P^*(\cdot \mid y))$ for all $x \in y$, showing that the conditions of this theorem hold. Conversely, if λ^* satisfies the equality in this theorem, then $\sum_{x \in y} P^*(x \mid y) L(x, P(\cdot \mid y)) = H_L(P^*(\cdot \mid y))$, so λ^* defines a supporting hyperplane at $P^*(\cdot \mid y)$.

For y with $P^*(y) = 0$, if the hyperplane defined by λ^* is nowhere below $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ as in Theorem 3, then using Lemma 4 it can be lowered to become a minimal supporting hyperplane, for which a realizing Q_y^* exists; conversely, the existence of a supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at Q_y^* that is nowhere above λ^* implies that λ^* is itself nowhere below $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$.

Uniqueness of the KT-vector: For any worst-case optimal strategy P^* , the characterization in this theorem puts an equality constraint on λ_x^* for each x , so only one vector can satisfy these conditions. We just saw that these conditions are equivalent to those in Theorem 3, so λ^* is the unique KT-vector.

Characterization of Q^* : By Theorem 7, Q^* is worst-case optimal for the contestant if and only if the (unique) KT-vector equals the left-hand side of (9). Similarly, if a strategy P^* is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster, then the KT-vector equals the right-hand side of (9). Therefore: if for given Q^* a worst-case optimal P^* exists for which (9) holds, then both sides equal the KT-vector and Q^* is worst-case optimal; if Q^* is worst-case optimal, then (9) holds for all worst-case optimal P^* ; and if, for given Q^* , (9) holds for all worst-case optimal P^* , then it holds for at least one worst-case optimal P^* by the existence of worst-case optimal P^* . \square

Proof of Theorem 10. For local L , by definition $L(x, Q) = f_x(Q(x))$ for some sequence of functions $f_x : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, \infty]$. Given a point $P \in \Delta_y$, the vector λ given by $\lambda_x = f_x(P(x))$ defines a supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at P , because L is proper. Each f_x is nonincreasing. (To see this, consider moving the point P along any line that goes through the vertex of the simplex Δ_X which puts all mass on some x . Because H_L is concave along this line, the farther away P is from that vertex, the higher a supporting hyperplane to H_L at P will be at that vertex.)

Given P^* and q satisfying the conditions in this theorem, let λ_x^* be $f_x(q_x)$ for each $x \in X$. We show that P^* is worst-case optimal by verifying that P^* and λ^* satisfy Theorem 3. For each y with $P^*(y) > 0$, λ^* defines a supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at $P^*(\cdot | y)$. For each other y , consider a supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at $Q_y(x) = q_x / \sum_{x' \in y} q_{x'}$: because $Q_y(x) \geq q_x$, $f_x(Q_y(x)) \leq f_x(q_x) = \lambda_x^*$, the hyperplane defined by λ^* is everywhere at least as high as this supporting hyperplane, as required.

For the converse: For strictly concave H_L , f_x is strictly decreasing. Define functions g_x as follows: $g_x(\lambda_x) = \inf\{q \in [0, 1] \mid f_x(q) \leq \lambda_x\}$. If f_x is continuous, g_x is just the ordinary inverse of f_x , but if f_x has a jump discontinuity at q , there will be an interval where g_x is constantly equal to q . In either case, g_x satisfies $g_x(f_x(q)) = q$ for all $q \in [0, 1]$.

Take P^* some worst-case optimal strategy, and λ^* a KT-vector. Define $q \in [0, 1]^X$ by $q_x = g_x(\lambda_x^*)$. We use Theorem 3 to show that q satisfies (10). For each $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, let $\lambda' \in \Delta_y$ be a minimal supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ that obeys $\lambda' \leq \lambda^*$; such a λ' exists by Lemma 4. Let Q_y be the (unique) point at which λ' supports $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$. It satisfies $f_x(Q_y(x)) = \lambda'_x$, from which it follows that $g_x(\lambda'_x) = g_x(f_x(Q_y(x))) = Q_y(x)$. Applying g_x to both sides of $\lambda'_x \leq \lambda_x^*$, we get $Q_y(x) \geq q_x$ for all $x \in y$, so that $\sum_{x \in y} q_x \leq \sum_{x \in y} Q_y(x) = 1$. If $P^*(y) > 0$, then the hyperplane defined by λ^* is itself a supporting hyperplane and Q_y is the point where it touches $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$, namely the point $P^*(\cdot | y)$. Because $Q_y(x)$ also satisfies $Q_y(x) = g_x(\lambda_x^*) = q_x$, the equality $q_x = Q_y(x) = P^*(x | y)$ follows. \square

Proof of Lemma 11. At least one vector q must exist because for the game with logarithmic loss and X, \mathcal{Y}, p as in the lemma, a worst-case optimal strategy P^* must exist by Theorem 3, and an associated RCAR vector q must exist for it by Theorem 10 using that H_L is strictly concave.

For logarithmic loss, the RCAR vector q and KT-vector λ^* are related by $\lambda_x^* = -\log q_x$. By Theorem 3, any strategy $P \in \mathcal{P}$ that does not agree with the KT-vector λ^* is not worst-case optimal, showing that q is unique. \square

Proof of Lemma 13. We will show that any nonvertical supporting hyperplane $\lambda \in \Lambda_y$ is supporting at no more than one point $P \in \Delta_y$. By Lemma 4, if a supporting hyperplane exists at P , then a minimum supporting hyperplane also exists at that point, so it suffices to restrict our attention to minimal $\lambda \in \Lambda_y$. We know that such a λ is realizable on y ; let Q be a distribution realizing it. Then Q minimizes the expected loss against any P at which λ supports $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$. For strictly proper L , there can be at most one such P , proving strict concavity. \square

Proof of Lemma 14. The generalized entropy function of L' is given by

$$H_{L'}(P) = aH_L(P) + \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} b_x P(x),$$

where $a \in \mathbf{R}_{>0}$ and $b \in \mathbf{R}^{\mathcal{X}}$ are the constants in the affine transformation (12). $H_{L'}$ is again finite and continuous. If P^* is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster in game \mathcal{G} , then by Theorem 3 there exists a KT-vector λ^* satisfying that theorem's conditions. Define a transformed vector by $\lambda' = a\lambda^* + b$. This is a KT-vector for \mathcal{G}' , showing that P^* is also worst-case optimal in that game.

If the conditions of Theorem 5 hold for \mathcal{G} , then they also holds for \mathcal{G}' : If λ' is a minimal supporting hyperplane to $H_{L'} \upharpoonright \Delta_y$, then $\lambda = (1/a)(\lambda' - b)$ is a minimal supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$. By assumption, λ is realizable on y in game \mathcal{G} , say by $Q \in \Delta_{\mathcal{X}}$. Then the same Q also realizes λ' in game \mathcal{G}' .

If Q^* is worst-case optimal for the contestant in \mathcal{G} , then by Theorem 7, λ given by $\lambda_x := \max_{y \ni x} L(x, Q^*_y)$ is a KT-vector. The transformed vector $\lambda' = a\lambda + b$ is then a KT-vector in \mathcal{G}' , so that by Theorem 7, Q^* is worst-case optimal in that game.

Because the affine transformation from L into L' can be reversed by a second affine transformation (with $a' = 1/a$ and $b' = -(1/a)b$), the reverse implications follow. \square

Proof of Lemma 16. For each $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, assume without loss of generality that $y \in \mathcal{Y}_1$. Then observe that the generalized entropies for \mathcal{G} and \mathcal{G}_1 are identical on Δ_y ; $P^*(y) > 0$ if and only if $P_1^*(y) > 0$; and $P^*(x | y) = P_1^*(x | y)$ for all $x \in y$. Now the claim follows from Theorem 3. \square

Proof of Lemma 17. By Theorem 3, λ^* is supporting to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_{y_1}$ at $P^*(\cdot | y_1)$. Define $\lambda^1 \in \Lambda_{y_1}$ equal to λ^* on y_1 . Then by Lemma 4, any $\lambda' \in \Lambda_{y_1}$ with $\lambda' \leq \lambda^1$ obeys $\lambda'_{x_1} = \lambda^1_{x_1}$.

Again by Theorem 3, λ^* is dominating to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_{y_2}$. Define λ^2 by $\lambda^2_x = \lambda^*_x$ for $x \in y_1 \cap y_2$, $\lambda^2_{x_1} = \lambda^*_{x_2}$, and 0 elsewhere. Because L is symmetric between x_1 and x_2 , $\lambda^2 \in \Lambda_{y_1}$. For $x \in y_1 \cap y_2$, $\lambda^1_x = \lambda^2_x$. If $\lambda^2_{x_1} \leq \lambda^1_{x_1}$, then $\lambda^2 \leq \lambda^1$; then we must have $\lambda^2_{x_1} = \lambda^1_{x_1}$. So $\lambda^2_{x_1} < \lambda^1_{x_1}$ is impossible, and we find $\lambda^*_{x_1} = \lambda^1_{x_1} \leq \lambda^2_{x_1} = \lambda^*_{x_2}$. \square

Proof of Theorem 18. For graph games, all loss functions are essentially local. We will make this precise by constructing functions f_x , analogous to those in the proof of Theorem 10: they have the property that for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, a supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at $P \in \Delta_y$ is given by λ with $\lambda_x = f_x(P(x))$ for all $x \in y$. (Note that we may not get $f_x(Q(x)) = L(x, Q)$ as in the case of local proper loss functions in the proof of Theorem 10, because the hyperplane realized by Q may not be supporting at Q if L is improper.)

For each $x \in \mathcal{X}$, if the only message in which x occurs is $\{x\}$, then $f_x(q)$ is only defined for $q = 1$, where it is $f_x(1) = H_L(e_x)$ (where e_x is the unique element of Δ_y). For other x , pick any message $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ with $y \ni x$ and $|y| = 2$. For all these y , the generalized entropies $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ are identical copies of the same function, by symmetry of L . For each $q \in [0, 1]$, pick a supporting hyperplane λ to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at the unique $P \in \Delta_y$ with $P(x) = q$, and let $f_x(q) = \lambda_x$. If H_L is not differentiable at P (including when $q \in \{0, 1\}$), we can choose a supporting hyperplane arbitrarily as long as the same one is used to define $f_x(q)$ and $f_{x'}(1 - q)$ wherever $\{x, x'\} \in \mathcal{Y}$. (In particular this means that if a connected component of \mathcal{Y} viewed as a graph contains an odd cycle, $f_x(1/2)$ must take the same value for all x in that component.)

As for local L , each f_x is nonincreasing because H_L is concave, and f_x is strictly decreasing if H_L is strictly concave. The rest of the proof is the same as for Theorem 10. \square

Proof of Theorem 19. We know from Theorem 10 that a quizmaster strategy P^* is worst-case optimal for logarithmic loss if and only if it is RCAR, and from Theorem 3 that such a P^* exists. Take any such P^* . Let λ be the KT-vector with respect to logarithmic loss, and $\mathcal{Y}_{P^*} = \{y \in \mathcal{Y} \mid P^*(y) > 0\}$. For any pair $y \in \mathcal{Y}_{P^*}, y' \in \mathcal{Y}$, we will show that there exists a bijection π from $y \setminus y'$ to $y' \setminus y$ such that $\lambda_x \leq \lambda_{\pi(x)}$ for all $x \in y \setminus y'$. This follows from Schrijver [21, Corollary 39.12a], but here we give a direct proof by induction on $|y' \setminus y|$:

- $|y' \setminus y| = 1$: Apply Lemma 17 to $y_1 = y$ and $y_2 = y'$ (using that for an RCAR strategy, $P^*(y_1) > 0$ implies $P^*(x_1, y_1) > 0$ for all $x_1 \in y_1$) to find the required inequality.
- $|y' \setminus y| > 1$: Let $y'_1 = y'$ and pick any $x_1 \in y \setminus y'$. Starting with $i = 1$, apply the basis exchange property on $y \setminus \{x_i\}$ and y'_i to find x'_i (it will be in $y'_i \setminus y \subseteq y'$); then apply it again on $y'_i \setminus \{x'_i\}$ and y to find $x_{i+1} \in y \setminus y'_i$, defining the message $y'_{i+1} = y'_i \setminus \{x'_i\} \cup \{x_{i+1}\}$ (which may not be in \mathcal{Y}_{P^*}). Continue until $x_{i+1} = x_1$. Now π defined by $\pi(x_1) = x'_1, \dots, \pi(x_i) = x'_i$ is a bijection from $\{x_1, \dots, x_i\} = (y \cap y'_{i+1}) \setminus y' \subseteq y \setminus y'$ to $\{x'_1, \dots, x'_i\} = y' \setminus y'_{i+1} \subseteq y' \setminus y$ (to see this, note that an element x'_j found in the basis exchange from y is then removed from y'_{j+1} so that it will not be found again; an element x_{j+1} found in the other basis exchange is added to y'_{j+1} with the same result), and for each $1 \leq j \leq i$, applying Lemma 17 to y and $y \cup \{x'_j\} \setminus \{x_j\}$ tells us that $\lambda_{x_j} \leq \lambda_{x'_j}$ as required. If $y'_{i+1} = y$, then this is the bijection we are looking for; otherwise, it can be completed by combining it with a bijection from $y \setminus y'_{i+1}$ to $y'_{i+1} \setminus y$, which exists by the induction hypothesis.

If also $y' \in \mathcal{Y}_{P^*}$, a bijection π' from $y' \setminus y$ to $y \setminus y'$ such that $\lambda_{x'} \leq \lambda_{\pi'(x')}$ is found by the same argument. Together, π and π' divide the outcomes in the two sets into disjoint cycles that must all have the same value for λ , defining an equivalence relation \sim on $y \oplus y'$. For logarithmic loss, the RCAR vector q obeys $q_x = e^{-\lambda_x}$, so it must also be constant within each equivalence class of \sim . Because the entropy of logarithmic loss is strictly concave, the conditionals of P^* must agree with q by Theorem 10.

Now take an arbitrary loss function L satisfying the conditions in the theorem, and the same strategy P^* . At an arbitrary message y with $P^*(y) > 0$, choose a supporting

hyperplane $\lambda' \in \Lambda_y$ to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at $P^*(\cdot | y)$ with the property that $\lambda'_x = \lambda'_{x'}$ for all $x, x' \in y$ with $\lambda_x = \lambda_{x'}$ and between which L is symmetric: there $P^*(x | y) = P^*(x' | y)$, so such a supporting hyperplane exists. For all $x, x' \in y$ with $q_x > q_{x'}$ (equivalently, $\lambda_x < \lambda_{x'}$) between which L is symmetric, this λ' satisfies $\lambda'_x \leq \lambda'_{x'}$. (A supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at $P^*(\cdot | y)$ with $\lambda'_x > \lambda'_{x'}$ would be lower at $(P^*)^{x \leftrightarrow x'}(\cdot | y)$ than at $P^*(\cdot | y)$, while by symmetry H_L is the same at those points: a contradiction.)

For each $y' \in \mathcal{Y}_{P^*}$ other than y , we saw that each $x' \in y' \setminus y$ is in the same equivalence class of \sim as some $x \in y \setminus y'$. In addition to $\lambda_x = \lambda_{x'}$, $x \sim x'$ implies that L is symmetric between x and x' (because L is symmetric with respect to exchanges in \mathcal{Y} , and π and π' were constructed using such exchanges). We extend the definition of λ' to y' by setting $\lambda'_{x'} = \lambda'_x$. This way, λ' defines a supporting hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_{y'}$ at $P^*(\cdot | y')$. We repeat this for all $y' \in \mathcal{Y}_{P^*}$, defining λ' on all of \mathcal{X} .

Also, for each $y' \in \mathcal{Y} \setminus \mathcal{Y}_{P^*}$ and $y \in \mathcal{Y}_{P^*}$, we have that a bijection π exists from $y \setminus y'$ to $y' \setminus y$ such that for all $x \in y \setminus y'$, L is symmetric between x and $\pi(x)$, and $\lambda_x \leq \lambda_{\pi(x)}$; then also $\lambda'_x \leq \lambda'_{\pi(x)}$, so λ' defines a dominating hyperplane to $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_{y'}$. Thus λ' is a KT-vector certifying that P^* is also worst-case optimal for L .

For the converse: If H_L is strictly concave, the supporting hyperplanes defined by a KT-vector λ' each touch $H_L \upharpoonright \Delta_y$ at only one point, so that any worst-case optimal strategy P' for the quizmaster must have $P'(x | y) = q_x$ for all $x \in y$ with $P'(y) > 0$. Therefore any worst-case optimal P' must be RCAR. \square

Proof of Theorem 20. We will first show how to construct a vector $q \in \mathbf{R}_{>0}^{\mathcal{X}}$ that satisfies $\sum_{x \in y} q_x \leq 1$ for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, and for all $x \in \mathcal{X}$, there is a message $x \in y \in \mathcal{Y}$ with $\sum_{x \in y} q_x = 1$. Then we will determine a marginal so that this vector q is the RCAR vector of the game with that marginal. We will additionally find two intersecting messages, both having sum 1, such that q represents the uniform distribution on one, but not on the other.

Two different constructions are given: one for nonuniform and one for uniform games.

If the game is not uniform, let k_2 be the size of the largest message in \mathcal{Y} . By connectedness, there exists a message of size less than k_2 that has nonempty intersection with a message of size k_2 . From among such messages, let y_1 be one of maximum size, and let $k_1 < k_2$ be that size. Finally, let y_2 be a messages of size k_2 that maximizes $|y_2 \cap y_1|$. Set initial values for q as follows:

$$q_x = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{k_1} & \text{for } x \in y_1; \\ \frac{|y_1 \setminus y_2|}{|y_2 \setminus y_1|} \cdot \frac{1}{k_1} & \text{for } x \in y_2 \setminus y_1; \\ \frac{1}{|y_2 \setminus y_1|} \cdot \frac{1}{k_1} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Note that the three cases of q_x are listed in nonincreasing order. Now $\sum_{x \in y_1} q_x = \sum_{x \in y_2} q_x = 1$, while $\sum_{x \in y} q_x \leq 1$ for general $y \in \mathcal{Y}$: $\max_x q_x = 1/k_1$, so a message $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ with $|y| \leq k_1$ will have sum at most 1; a message with $|y| = k_2$ will share no more outcomes with y_1 than y_2 does and thus cannot have a larger sum; and because a message with $k_1 < |y| < k_2$ has empty intersection with y_2 , the $k_1 - 1$ largest elements of $(q_x)_{x \in y}$ sum to at most $(k_1 - 1)/k_1$, while the fewer than $|y_2 \setminus y_1|$ remaining elements all equal $1/(|y_2 \setminus y_1| \cdot k_1)$ and hence sum to less than $1/k_1$.

A greedy algorithm that repeatedly increments some q_x until none can be increased further, while maintaining the inequality $\sum_{x \in y} q_x \leq 1$ on each y , will terminate with a q satisfying the conditions stated at the beginning of the proof. This q will be unchanged and thus still be uniform on y_1 , while on the intersecting message y_2 , q also still sums to 1 but is not uniform.

For the case of uniform games, the construction is similar. Let k be the size of the game's messages. By Oxley [24, Corollary 2.1.5], a nonempty family of sets \mathcal{Y} is the collection of bases of a matroid if and only if for all $y_1, y_2 \in \mathcal{Y}$ and $x_2 \in y_2 \setminus y_1$,

$$y_1 \cup \{x_2\} \setminus \{x_1\} \in \mathcal{Y} \text{ for some } x_1 \in y_1 \setminus y_2. \quad (\text{A.3})$$

Because our \mathcal{Y} is not a matroid, it follows that there exist $y_1, y_2 \in \mathcal{Y}$ and $x_2 \in y_2 \setminus y_1$ for which no corresponding x_1 exists. For $k \geq 3$ (which holds because the game we consider is not a graph game), we claim something stronger: that there exist y_1, y_2, x_2 as above with the additional property that y_1 and y_2 intersect. The proof of this claim is below.

Using such y_1 and x_2 and some $0 < \epsilon < 1/k$, initialize q as follows:

$$q_x = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{k} & \text{for } x \in y_1; \\ \frac{1}{k} + \epsilon & \text{for } x = x_2; \\ \frac{1}{k} - \epsilon & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Because any message containing x_2 also contains at least one other outcome not in y_1 , we again have $\sum_{x \in y} q_x \leq 1$ for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$.

For $k \geq 3$, the initial q has the property that the set of outcomes x for which q_x cannot be increased further (we call these outcomes *maximized*) is connected by messages y with $\sum_{x \in y} q_x = 1$ (that is, the maximized outcomes cannot be partitioned into two nonempty sets such that each sum-1 message is contained in one of these sets); this is because y_1 has sum 1, and any other message with sum 1 must intersect y_1 . (For $k = 2$, this would not be the case: the only messages having sum 1 would be y_1 and all messages that contain x_2 , but y_1 would not intersect any of these.) We can have the greedy algorithm maintain this as an invariant: Because the game is connected, there is always a message partially in the set of maximized outcomes and partially outside. We call such a message a *crossing* message. Each round, we pick an outcome x that is not maximized yet and is contained in a crossing message; if x_2 is not maximized, we always pick $x = x_2$ (using that it is contained in the crossing message y_2). The tightest constraint on increasing q_x will come from a crossing message, because for any non-crossing message $y \ni x$, we have $\sum_{x' \in y \setminus \{x\}} q_{x'} = (k-1)(1/k - \epsilon)$, which is the smallest possible value of this sum. So increasing q_x as much as possible will cause a crossing message to get sum equal to 1. This message connects x to the set of previously maximized outcomes, and any other outcomes that were maximized by this increment must be contained in some message that also contains x .

When the greedy algorithm terminates, q will still be uniform on y_1 , while there will be another message on which q sums to one but is not uniform. (This may not be y_2 , which may not have sum 1.) Because all outcomes are connected by sum-1 messages, we can also find a pair of intersecting messages, one of which is uniform and one of which is not. Use these two messages as y_1 and y_2 in the sequel.

Having found, for both nonuniform and uniform games, a vector q and messages y_1 and y_2 as described above, we let strategy P be RCAR with vector q and $P(y)$ uniform on $\{y \mid \sum_{x \in y} q_x = 1\}$. This P is a worst-case optimal strategy for the game with logarithmic loss and marginal $p_x = \sum_{y \ni x} P(x, y)$, and q is its unique RCAR vector.

We will show that P is not worst-case optimal for the game with the same marginal and Brier loss. Brier loss is proper and continuous, so by Theorem 9, $L(x, P(\cdot \mid y_1)) = L(x, P(\cdot \mid y_2))$ for worst-case optimal P . These are squared Euclidean distances from a vertex of the simplex to the predicted distribution. However, the equality will not hold for P :

Among all predictions in Δ_{y_i} with $Q(x) = q_x$ for each $x \in y_1 \cap y_2$ (this set of predictions is the intersection of Δ_{y_i} with an affine subspace), the squared Euclidean distance $L(x, Q)$ between such Q and given vertex $x \in y_1 \cap y_2$ is uniquely minimized by Q uniform on the outcomes not in $y_1 \cap y_2$ (this is the orthogonal projection of the vertex onto that subspace). For a uniform game, $P(\cdot \mid y_1)$ is uniform and thus $L(x, P(\cdot \mid y_1))$ equals this minimum; $P(\cdot \mid y_1)$ differs from the uniform distribution at some outcomes not in $y_1 \cap y_2$ and thus $L(x, P(\cdot \mid y_2))$ is larger than the minimum.

For a nonuniform game, $P(\cdot \mid y_1)$ is uniform on $y_1 \setminus y_2$ and $P(\cdot \mid y_2)$ is uniform on $y_2 \setminus y_1$, so both minimize the distance to the vertex in their respective subspaces. However, the subspace for y_2 is isomorphic to a subspace contained in the subspace for y_1 and not containing $P(\cdot \mid y_1)$. Therefore $L(x, P(\cdot \mid y_1)) < L(x, P(\cdot \mid y_2))$. \square

Proof of claim. Suppose for a contradiction that any pair of intersecting messages y, y' obeys the above exchange property (A.3) for all $x' \in y' \setminus y$. Let y_1, y_2 be two messages that fail (A.3) for some outcome $x_2 \in y_2 \setminus y_1$; it follows from our assumption that they are disjoint. Because \mathcal{Y} is connected, there exists a sequence of messages starting with y_1 and ending with y_2 in which adjacent messages intersect. Using (A.3), we can extend this sequence to one where adjacent messages differ by the exchange of one outcome: given intersecting $y, y'' \in \mathcal{Y}$ with $d := |y'' \setminus y| > 1$, we find $y' \in \mathcal{Y}$ with $|y' \setminus y| = 1$ and $|y'' \setminus y'| = d - 1$. Write the entire sequence as $y^0 = y_1, y^1, \dots, y^n = y_2$.

We have $n \geq k$, because $n < k$ would imply that $y_1 \cap y_2 \neq \emptyset$. If $n > k$, we can find a shorter sequence as follows: pick $0 \leq i < j \leq n - k$ for which $y^i \cap y^{j+1} \neq \emptyset$; this holds if $j + 1 - i < k$, so such i, j can always be found if $k \geq 3$. Let x' be the unique outcome in $y^{j+1} \setminus y^j$.

- If $x' \notin y^{j+k}$ (intuitively, adding x' leads us on a detour that can be avoided when going to y^{j+k}): In each of the k exchange steps from y^j to y^{j+k} , one outcome was removed. One of those outcomes was x' , which is not in y^j , so at most $k - 1$ outcomes from y^j were removed. Thus y^j and y^{j+k} intersect, and a shorter path between them can be found using (A.3).
- If $x' \in y^{j+k}$ and $x' \in y^i$ (removing x' is the start of a detour): We can use (A.3) to find a shorter path between y^i and y^{j+k} .
- If $x' \in y^{j+k}$ but $x' \notin y^i$ (adding x' is apparently useful, but can be done sooner): Apply (A.3) to messages y^i and y^{j+1} (which intersect) and outcome x' (which is in y^{j+1} but not in y^i) to find a message y' that is one step away from y^i and contains x' . From y' , we can find a path to y^{j+k} by (A.3) taking fewer than k steps. Thus we can get from y^i to y^{j+k} in at most k steps.

Thus we can always find a sequence with $n = k$.

Given such a sequence y^0, y^1, \dots, y^n , we will now show a contradiction with the assumption that $y_1 = y^0$ and $y_2 = y^n$ fail (A.3) by showing that for any $x_2 \in y_2$, a message exists that differs from y_1 by adding x_2 and removing one other outcome. If $x_2 \in y^1$, then y^1 is such a message and we are done. Otherwise, we can apply (A.3) to y^1 and $x_2 \in y_2$ to find a message y' containing x_2 ; because $k \geq 3$, this message still intersects y_1 , so applying (A.3) to y_1 and $x_2 \in y'$ gives the message we are looking for. This shows by contradiction that if a connected uniform game with $k \geq 3$ is not a matroid game, there exists a pair of intersecting messages y_1, y_2 and an outcome $x_2 \in y_2 \setminus y_1$ that do not satisfy (A.3). \square